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Articles
AUTONOMY, SELF-GOVERNANCE, AND THE
MARGIN OF APPRECIATION: DEVELOPING A
JURISPRUDENCE OF DIVERSITY WITHIN
UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS
Douglas Lee Donoho*
INTRODUCTION

Profound diversity is a persistent characteristic of the
international community.
The implications of this
diversity, however, have increasingly generated controversy
within the international human rights system, challenging
its tendency toward universalism. Many human rights
advocates, particularly Westerners, have uncritically
assumed that the widespread adoption of international
treaties has established human rights that are universal in
scope and content. Yet the manifestations of many human
rights are still nascent and their specific meanings unclear.'
In practical terms, rights are contextual in many important
respects.2 For example, the degree to which free speech
* Professor of Law, Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad Law Center;
LL.M., Harvard Law School; J.D., Rutgers University-Camden; B.A., Kalamazoo
College.
' See infra notes 102-10 and accompanying text. See also Michael Perry,
Normative Indeterminacy and the Problem of JudicialRole, 19 HARV. J. L. & PUB.
POLVY 375, 382-83 (1996); Douglas Donoho, The Role of Human Rights in Global
Security Issues: A Normative and InstitutionalCritique, 14 MICH. J. INTL LAW 827,
837-43, 847-50 (1993); Henry Steiner, Book Review (International Human Rights In
A Nutshell) 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 603, 604-05 (1990). The specific meaning of many
human rights remains under-developed. Reasons for this include the relative
newness of the norms and the international system's limited capacity for rendering
authoritative interpretations of rights. See Donoho, supra at 866-68.
2 See infra notes 4, 7-10, 29, 46-48, 76-77, 105-09 and accompanying
text. See
also Luan-Vu Tran, The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms: Justification,
Methods, and Limits of a MulticulturalInterpretation,28 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV.
33, 39-45 (1996); Carol Weisbrod, Universals and Particulars:A Comment on
Women's Human Rights and Religious Marriage Contracts, 9 S. CAL. REV. L. &
WOMEN'S STUD. 77, 80-87 (1999) (discussing how cultural and religious orientations
manifest widely divergent legal approaches to marriage rights).
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protects sexually explicit expression from government
censorship varies significantly among different societies
and cultures.3 Rights appear to have different implications
among different peoples depending upon their particular
political, religious, social, and cultural orientations.4
The power of this empirical observation, coupled with a
deep sensitivity to the ideals of self-determination,5
3 See, e.g., Handyside v. United Kingdom, 1 Eur. H.R. Rep. 737
paras. 47-49
(1976); Muller v. Switzerland, 13 Eur. H.R. Rep. 212 paras. 36-43 (1988); Miller v.
California, 413 U.S. 15, 24-26 (1973). See also Andrew Jacobs, Rome Wasn't Built in
a Day: The Subtle Transformation in JudicialArguments Over Gay Rights, 1996
WISC. L. REV. 905 (1996); Scott Goodroad, Comment, The Challenge of Free Speech:
Asian Values v. Unfettered Free Speech, An Analysis of Singapore and Malaysia in
the New Global Order, 9 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 259, 259-62 (1996); Lawrence

Solum, The Value of Dissent, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 859, 863 (2000) (describing the

effects of culture and political life on the meaning of free speech within the United
States); Abdullahi An-Na'im, The Contingent Universality of Human Rights: The
Case of Freedom of Expression in African and Islamic Contexts, 11 EMORY INT'L L.
REV. 29 (1997); 1999 Human Rights Watch Report, Freedom of Expression on the
Internet,at http://www.hrw.org/hrw/worldreport99/special/internet.html (last visited
Sept. 9, 2001).
' There is extensive literature exploring various cultural, political and social
orientations regarding human rights. See, e.g., Symposium, East Asian Approaches
to Human Rights, 2 BUFF. J. INT'L L. 193 (1996); HUMAN RIGHTS IN CROSSCULTURAL PERSPECTIVES: A QUEST FOR CONSENSUS (Abdullahi An-Na'im ed., 1992)

[hereinafter CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES]; Abdullahi An-Na'im, Problems of
Universal Cultural Legitimacy for Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA:
CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES 331-68 (Abdullahi An-Na'im & Francis Deng eds.,
1990) [hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA]; HUMAN RIGHTS IN EAST ASIA: A

CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE (James Hsiung ed., 1985); Laksham Marasinghe,
Traditional Conceptions of Human Rights in Africa, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND
DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA, 32-45 (Claude E. Welsch & Ronald Melzner eds., 1984);
THE MORAL IMPERATIVES OF HUMAN RIGHTS: A WORLD SURVEY (Kenneth Thompson

ed., 1980) [hereinafter MORAL IMPERATIVES]; HUMAN RIGHTS: CULTURAL AND
IDEOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES (Adamamtia Pollis & Peter Schwab eds., 1979)
[hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS PERSPECTIVES]. See also infra notes 7, 8, 18, 29, and
32. Empirical evidence that different societies understand rights differently does
not, of course, resolve the question of whether the international system should, or
can as a legal matter, demand or promote universal, uniform meaning. See infra text
accompanying notes 55-101.
Self-determination is a contested concept, subject to a wide variety of
interpretations and meanings. See generally Ved P. Nanda, Revisiting SelfDeterminationas an InternationalLaw Concept: A Major Challenge in the Post-Cold
War Era, 3 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 443, 443-45 (1997) [hereinafter Nanda,
Revisiting]; Hurst Hannum, Rethinking Self-Determination,34 VA. J. INT. L. 1, 1-57
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democratic self-governance, autonomy,6 and cultural
diversity, has posed significant and lingering dilemmas for
(1993); Joe Oloka-Onyango, HereticalReflections on the Right to Self-Determination:
Prospectsand Problems for a Democratic Global Future in the New Millennium, 15
AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 151, 151-55, 166-68 (1999). One of its central manifestations
concerns the potential for "internal" self-determination in which "peoples" are
argued to possess the right to determine their own political and cultural identity.
See Hannum, supra, at 57-63. The most extreme and controversial implication of
this idea is that groups of "peoples" (however defined) may manifest their selfdetermination through secession.
See id. at 40-57; Ved P. Nanda, SelfDetermination Under InternationalLaw: Validity of Claims to Secede, 13 CASE W.
RES. J. INT'L L. 257, 266 (1981). A second, fairly noncontroversial implication of
internal self-determination, however, is simply that the populace of existing nation
states have a right to determine their political, religious, economic and cultural
identity free from outside interference. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 1514, U.N. GAOR, 15th
Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 66, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960) ("freely determine their political
status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development"). Despite
the potent controversy regarding the "secessionist" implications of internal selfdetermination, the impulse to recognize the autonomy of peoples to determine their
own political, social and economic future remains a powerful force on the
international scene. See, e.g., Fredric Kirgis, Jr., Comment, The Degrees of SelfDetermination in the United Nations' Era, 88 AM. J. INVL L. 304, 306-08 (1994);
Nanda, Revisiting, supra at 445-46, 450-51. See generally Gregory H. Fox, SelfDetermination in the Post-Cold War Era:A New Internal Focus?, 16 MICH. J. INTL
L. 733 (1995) (book review). Most recently, the Final Declaration of the 1993
U.N. World Conference on Human Rights carefully disavowed the secessionist
implications of self-determination, while adding the important proviso that
government must be representative of all people within its jurisdiction without
discrimination:
[the right of self-determination] shall not be construed as authorizing or
encouraging any action which would dismember or impair totally or in part,
the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent
States conducting themselves in compliance with the principle of equal
rights and self-determination of peoples and thuspossessed of a Government
representingthe whole people belonging to the territory without distinctionof
any kind.
United Nations World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna Declaration and
Programme of Action, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/24 (Part I) (1993), at para. 2, reprinted
in 32 I.L.M. 1661 (1993) [hereinafter Vienna Declaration] (emphasis added). See
also James Wilets, The Demise of the Nation-State: Towards a New Theory of the
State UnderInternationalLaw, 17 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 193 (1999).
6 As used here, autonomy refers to the idea that individuals, specific groups of
people, or even political entities such as nation states, should be allowed to manifest
and develop their social, cultural, political and economic preferences with a degree of
independence from the prevailing legal order. In international law and human
rights, the value of autonomy is clearly reflected in the liberal, individualistic
orientation of most human rights treaties. See infra note 59. More critical for
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the international human rights system. How can human
rights be sufficiently universal to make them appropriate
subjects for meaningful international regulation and yet
consistent with, and appropriate to, the world's diversity?
Can international organizations effectively promote and
protect universal rights and yet respect and accommodate
local preferences reflecting genuine cultural, political,
religious, and moral diversity? Should they?
These questions are not abstract. The potential for
divergent interpretations of rights is enormous and will
ultimately affect the lives of millions. Practices such as
veiling, female genital surgeries, and gender segregation
are attacked as barbaric anachronisms and violations of
human rights7 while simultaneously defended as cultural or
present purposes, autonomy values are also reflected in the discourse over "internal"
self-determination. See supra note 5. Both the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR) and International Covenant on Economic Social and
Cultural Rights (ICESCR), for example, contain an apparent endorsement of an
"autonomy" version of self-determination through a common Article One: "All
peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue of that right, they freely
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural
development." International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by the
General Assembly Dec. 16, 1966, art. 1, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23,
1976) [hereinafter ICCPR]; International Covenant on Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights, adopted by the GeneralAssembly Dec. 16, 1966, art. 1, 993 U.N.T.S.
3 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976) [hereinafter ICESCRI. See also Hannum, supra
note 5, at 44-45, 57-63. In this regard, autonomy regimes are often proposed as an
alternative to secession in the context of self-determination claims by ethnic or
indigenous populations. See, e.g., S. James Anaya, The Capacity of International
Law to Advance Ethnic or Nationality Rights Claims, 75 IOWA L. REv. 837 (1990);
see infra notes 20-21. Because autonomy implies self-governance, it is also an
obvious feature of the developing right to democratic governance. See Thomas
Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 46, 53-56
(1992). Even the concept of democratic governance is, however, subject to significant
interpretive variations that depend on each society's expressions of political and
social preferences. See, e.g., Reginald Ezetah, The Right to Democracy: A Qualitative
Inquiry, 22 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 495, 502-03, 513-14 (1997).
7 See, e.g., A.M. Rosenthal, Female Genital Torture, N.Y. TIMES, December
29,
1992, at A15; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH REPORT ON SAUDI ARABIA, at
http://www.hrw.org/wr2k/Mena-08.htm (last visited Sept. 9, 2001); Note, What's
Culture Got to Do With It? Excising the Harmful Traditionof Female Circumcision,
106 HARv. L. REV. 1944, 1950-53 (1993); John Okwubanego, Comment, Female
Circumcision and the Girl Child in Africa and the Middle East: The Eyes of the
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religious imperatives.8 Similarly, governments and social
majorities frequently invoke the "cultural card" to justify
such things as unequal inheritance, denial of same sex
marriage, and expulsion of homosexuals from the military.9
World Are Blind to the Conquered, 33 INT'L LAW. 159, 165, 173-79 (1999); Kristin
Miller, Comment, Human Rights of Women in Iran: The UniversalistApproach and
the Relativist Response, 10 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 779, 791-800 (1996); Riane Eisler,
Human Rights: Toward an IntegratedTheory for Action, 9 HUM. RTS. Q. 287, 295-96
(1987); Ann Elizabeth Mayer, Universal Versus Islamic Human Rights: A Clash of
Cultures or a Clash with a Construct?, 15 MICH. J. INT'L L. 307, 390-93 (1994)
(discussing the use of dress restrictions including the chador); Donna Sullivan,
Gender Equality and Religious Freedom: Toward a Framework for Conflict
Resolution, 24 N.Y.U. J. INTL L. & POL. 795, 795, 824-30 (discussing gender
segregation and veiling); Mohammed Ghasemi, Islam, International Rights &
Women's Equality; Afghan Women Under Taliban Rule, 8 S. CAL. REV. L. &
WOMEN'S STUD. 445, 459-64 (1999).
8 For general discussions regarding religious and cultural justifications for such
social practices, see Sullivan, supra note 7, at 795, 810-14, 824-46; Urtan Kabliq,
Beyond the Veil?: An Analysis of the Provisions of the Women's Convention in the
Law as Stipulated in the Shari'ah, 2 BUFF. J. INT'L L. 1, 3-5, 18-42 (1995);
Okwubanego, supra note 7, at 168-69, 175-79; Bassam Tibi, Islamic Law/Shari'a
Human Rights, Universal Morality and InternationalRelations, 16 HUM. RTS. Q.
277, 278 (1994); Reza Afshari, An Essay on Islamic Cultural Relativism in the
Discourse of Human Rights, 16 HUM. RTS. Q. 235, 252-60, 263-66 (1994). See also
Benji Anosike, Claims of "GenitalMutilation"A New Ploy for Gaining United States
Asylum, N.Y. BEACON, May 20, 1996, at 11, available in 1996 WL 15800335
(rejecting the factual premises of asylum claims alleging fear of circumcision and
lamenting negative stereotyping of African cultures); Maynard Merwine, Letter to
the Editor, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 1993, at A24 (condemning the ethnocentrism of
A. M. Rosenthal's attack, see supra note 7, on female circumcision); Zainab
Chaudhry, The Myth of Misogyny: A Reanalysis of Women's Inheritance in Islamic
Law, 61 ALB. L. REV. 511 (1997) (refuting "misconception" that Islamic law disfavors
women); Richard Shweder, What About "Female Genital Mutilation"?, 129
DAEDALUS 209 (Vol. 4, Sept. 2000) (critiquing the empirical basis for Western "antiFGM" literature and reviewing alternative cultural viewpoints regarding the
practice). These perspectives on religious or cultural imperatives have caused some
Islamic states and politicians to suggest partial rejection of the current catalogue of
western-based international human rights norms. The 1990 Cairo Declaration on
Human Rights in Islam, for example, has been proposed as an alternative, Islamic
vision of human rights. See Heiner Bielefeldt, Muslim Voices in the Human Rights
Debate, 17 HUM. RTS. Q. 587, 596-97, 601-05 (1995); Mayer, supra note 7, at 327-50,
374-77.
" See, e.g., 1999 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH REPORT ON DISCRIMINATION AGAINST
WOMEN, available at http'//www.hrw.org/hrw/worldreport99/women/women3.
html#top (last visited Sept. 9, 2001); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, GAY AND LESBIAN
RIGHTS, available at http'//www.hrw.org/jre/worldreport99/special/gay.html (last
visited Sept. 9, 2001). See also Jack Anderson, IranianHomosexuals Fearfor Their
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Laws preventing divorce, abortion, consensual sodomy, or
assisted suicide may reflect genuine and deeply ingrained
local values and yet be manifestly inconsistent with
international human rights standards."l The crux of such
controversies concerns the complex and subtle interplay
between the desire for universal international standards
and the need to accommodate the diverse views found
throughout the world.
These fundamental conflicts are complicated by
repressive governments, bent on deflecting the heat of
international scrutiny, that have feigned concern over
cultural diversity and autonomy to serve their political
purposes. 1 Such disingenuous claims of diversity, often
under the guise of cultural relativism, 2 have left most
Lives, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 22, 1990, at A17 (public beheading of three homosexual
men and stoning of two accused lesbians); Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P. 2d 44 (Haw. 1993)
(denying right to same sex marriage under the Hawaiian state constitution). But see
Robert Morris, ConfiguringThe Bo(u)nds of Marriage:The Implicationsof Hawaiian
Culture & Values for the Debate About Homogamy, 8 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 105
(1996) (arguing that Hawaiian culture traditionally recognized same sex
relationships).
'o Compare Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), with Toonen v. Australia,
Comm., No. 488/1992, U.N. Doc. CCPR/c/50/D/488/1992 (1994) (holding that
Tasmanian sodomy law violates the ICCPR). See also Dudgeon v. United Kingdom,
45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1981) (holding that sodomy laws violate the European
Convention on Human Rights); Norris v. Ireland, 142 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A). (1988);
Modinos v. Cyprus, App. No. 15070/89, 67 Eur. Comm. H.R. Dec. & Rep. 295 (1991);
James Wilets, Conceptualizing Private Violence Against Sexual Minorities as
Gendered Violence: An Internationaland Comparative Law Perspective, 60 ALB. L.
REV. 989, 1024-30 (1997) (reviewing the divergent cultural and legal views of
consensual homosexual relationships). Compare Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (upholding ban on gays in the U.S. military), with Lustig-Prean &
Beckett v. The United Kingdom, 29 Eur. H.R. Rep. 548 (Sept 27, 1999) and Smith &
Grady v. The United Kingdom, 29 Eur. H.R. Rep. 493 (Sept 27, 1999) (concluding
that the expulsion of gays from military service violates the European Convention).
" See Mayer, supra note 7, at 327-50, 371-77; Anne Bayefsky, Cultural
Sovereignty, Relativism and International Human Rights: New Excuses for Old
Strategies, 9 RATIO JURIS 42, 44-47, 52-53 (1996); infra text accompanying notes 4763. Even those writers most sensitive to diversity in human rights acknowledge the
enormous potential for abuse that the relativist insight provides. See, e.g.,
Adamantia Pollis, Cultural Relativism Revisited: Through a State Prism, 18 HUM.
RTS. Q. 316 (1996).
12 See infra text accompanying footnotes 25-31. See generally Douglas Donoho,
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international human rights bodies largely preferring to
ignore the issues posed by diversity rather than develop a
coherent jurisprudence to account for them.
To a significant degree, the political rhetoric surrounding
the tired debate over cultural relativism 3 has obscured the
deeper issues that global diversity presents for the
international human rights system. Relativism is neither
synonymous with, nor necessary to, a pluralistic approach
to human rights that acknowledges diversity, autonomy,
and the value of self-governance. Indeed, the vast majority
of states have long discredited the extreme relativist
position of some repressive states, who claim that diversity
delegitimizes international scrutiny or renders some human
rights inapplicable. There remains, however, a genuine and
persistent desire among some non-Western societies to
manifest their cultural and social preferences-and avoid
Western domination-in the development of human rights
norms.
Ultimately, acknowledgment of diversity and
accommodation of self-governance and autonomy within the
international human rights system seems inevitable,
necessary, and appropriate.14 Whether for right or wrong,
the political organizations of the United Nations have
apparently endorsed this view, reflecting the international
community's seemingly contradictory impulses toward
universalism and diversity. Perhaps more importantly, by
relying upon the primacy of state implementation and weak
mechanisms
for
international
supervision,' 6
the
international system is already structured to allow for

Relativism Versus Universalism in Human Rights: The Search For Meaningful
Standards,27 STAN. J. DTL LAW 345, 348-51, 368-69, 382-86 (1991).
:' See infra text accompanying footnotes 45-54.
14 See infra Part III-C.
15 See infra text accompanying notes 51-57, 78-84. See also Diana AytonShenker, The Challenge of Human Rights and Cultural Diversity, at
http://www.un.org/rights/dpil627e.htm (last visited Sept. 10, 2001).
16 See infra text accompanying notes 92-99.
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diverse interpretations of the system's generally abstract
rights.17
The critical question addressed in this Article is how
international institutions can develop a jurisprudence that
strikes an appropriate balance between universal rights
and the competing values of self-governance, autonomy,
and diversity, while simultaneously providing effective
international supervision of human rights standards. In
particular, I focus upon parallels that exist between these
competing forces and the accommodations that judicial
institutions have traditionally made between individual
rights, democratic majorities, and the public interest.
Accordingly, I consider whether useful analogies may be
drawn from European and North American jurisprudence
that has, to some degree, developed judicial doctrines that
balance similar competing concerns. I evaluate doctrines
involving hierarchies of rights, levels of scrutiny, and the
European Human Rights System's "margin of appreciation"
doctrine, among others. I conclude that much of this
jurisprudence, particularly to the extent that it addresses
critical questions about appropriate standards of review
and institutional competency, provides important insights
regarding how international human rights institutions
might successfully navigate the international communities'
seemingly contradictory impulses toward universal rights
and diversity.
Part I describes the background and context of the
persistent debate over universal rights and diversity.
Part II details how this debate rose to political prominence
at the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights. Part III
attempts to untangle the resulting political rhetoric of
universal versus relative rights from a largely pragmatic
legal perspective, taking into account the political and
social realities in which the debate is currently being
17

See infra text accompanying notes 92-99, 111-32. See Donoho, Relativism,

supra note 12, at 348-51.
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waged. Part IV identifies the critical role of the decisionmaking process and the varying methods of interpretation.
Part V describes various doctrines developed by the
European Court of Human Rights and the United States
Supreme Court to accommodate analogous concerns, and
evaluates the appropriateness of such doctrines in the
international human rights setting.
I.

UNIVERSAL VERSUS RELATIVE RIGHTS:
THE CURRENT DEBATE OVER DIVERSITY

The world is comprised of a rich tapestry of diverse
religious, social, political, cultural, and moral communities.
This richly textured diversity has manifested itself in a
variety of ways in the evolution of the international human
rights system. Even in the system's earliest stages,
accusations of Western domination and cultural
imperialism challenged the manifestly Western orientation
of its founding norms. 8 This challenge to the philosophical
18

See, e.g., American Anthropological Ass'n, Statement on Human Rights, 49

AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 539 (1947); Chung-Shu Lo, Human Rights in the Chinese
Tradition, in HUMAN RIGHTS: COMMENTS AND INTERPRETATIONS 186 (UNESCO ed.,
1949). See also Adamantia Pollis & Peter Schwab, Human Rights: A Western
Construct with Limited Application, in HUMAN RIGHTS PERSPECTIVES, supra note 4;
RAM
0NDo
PANNIKKAR, IS THE NOTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS A WESTERN CONCEPT?
DIOGENES 120, 75-102 (1982). When the United Nations adopted the Universal
Declaration in 1948, only 58 of the more than 190 current world states were
members. G-A. Res. 217 A(3), U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71. Western
domination of the United Nations during its creation has lead some commentators to
challenge the Declaration's status despite ubiquitous endorsements of its
universality by U.N. institutions. See Pollis & Schwab, supra, at 8-10; Bihari
Kausikan, Asia's Different Standard, 92 FOREIGN POL'Y 24, 34 (1993) ("The hard
core of rights that are truly universal is smaller than many in the West are wont to
pretend. Forty-five years after the Universal Declaration was adopted, many of its
30 articles are still subject to debate over interpretation and application.. ."). But
see BARRY E. CARTER & PHILIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 898-900 (1995)
(arguing that the Universal Declaration has become binding customary
international law). See generally Hurst Hannum, The Status and Future of the
Customary International Law of Human Rights: The Status of the Universal
Declarationof Human Rights in National and InternationalLaw, 25 GA. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 287 (1996).
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orientation of international human rights led to the
creation of international norms protecting social, cultural,
and economic values, 9 and has prompted the development
of group rights and special protections for minorities. 20 The
desires of cultural, ethnic, or religious minorities for
autonomy or self-determination have also found expression
in such claims.2
As the system's normative framework developed, those
resisting change and perceived "westernization" extended
traditional "non-interference" and sovereignty defenses 2 to
include the preservation of cultural or religious
preferences.23 Although commonly phrased in terms of
19 E.g.,

ICESCR, supra note 6. See generally INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN

CONTEXT: LAW, POLITICS, AND MORALS, 256-64 (Henry Steiner & Philip Alston eds.,
1996) [hereinafter LAW, POLITICS, & MORALS].
20 See generally Raidea Torres, The Rights Of Indigenous Populations: The
Emerging International Norm, 16 YALE J. INT'L L. 127 (1991) (discussing the
interplay between culture, autonomy and indigenous rights); Philip Alston, A Third
Generation of Solidarity Rights: Progressive Development or Obfuscation of
InternationalHuman Rights Law?, 29 NETH. INT'L L. REV. 307 (1982); Declaration
on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious, or Linguistic
Minorities, G.A. Res. 37/135, 18 December 1982; U.N. Draft Declaration on the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples, U.N. Doc. E/CN. 4/Sub. 2/1994/2/Add. 1, Aug. 26 1994,
reprintedin 34 I.L.M. 541 (1995). See also Henry Steiner, Ideals and Counter-Ideals
in the Struggle Over Autonomy Regimes for Minorities, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1539, 1547-51 (1991).
21 Id.
See Anaya, supra note 6, at 841-42 nn.20-26; Yash Ghai, Universalism and
Relativism: Human Rights as a Framework for Negotiating Inter-Ethnic Claims, 21
CARDOZO L. REV. 1095, 1101-03 (2000) (discussing relativism, rights and the claims
of cultural minorities in multi-cultural societies); Raidza Torres, Revisiting the
Emerging InternationalNorm on Indigenous Rights: Autonomy as an Option, 25
YALE J. INT'L L. 291, 292-97 (2000).
22 See, e.g., GRIGORII IVANOVICH TUNKIN, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 79
(1974); LOUIS HENKIN, Human Rights and "Domestic Jurisdiction," in
INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS (Louis Henkin ed., 1981). Such sovereignty-based
defenses are still commonly espoused by countries such as the People's Republic of
China. At the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights, China, India, Bangladesh,
and Cuba, all stressed national sovereignty, non-interference, and domestic
jurisdiction in formulating their positions. See Bayefsky supra note 11, at 47. See
also Pollis, supra note 11, at 331-32; Mayer, supra note 7, at 371-77; Donoho,
Relativism, supra note 12, at 348-54.
See, e.g., Bihari Kausikan, Asia's Different Standard, 92 FOR. POLy 24, 39
(1993); Sharon Hom, Commentary: Re-Positioning Human Rights Discourse on
"Asian"Perspectives, 3 BUFF. J. INT'L L. 209, 209-10 (1996); Mayer, supra note 7, at
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religion and culture, these arguments also clearly cover
economic, social, and political preferences as well. 24 These
challenges to the universality of rights eventually found a
powerful rhetorical ally in the philosophical doctrines of
cultural and ethical relativism. 25 Although relativism has
manifested many variants from its modern origins in
anthropology and moral philosophy,2 6 a relativistic
viewpoint in human rights essentially posits that values are
only valid contextually. This viewpoint is largely based on
the empirical observation that moral practices and values
vary among societies depending on circumstance, tradition,
history and social context.27
Since values are social
313-20, 373-75 (detailing the promotion of this position by China and other states at
the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights); Bayefsky, supra note 11, at 43, 47-50
(same).
24 See Ghai, supra note 21, at 1097; Karen Engle, Culture and Human Rights:
The Asian Values Debate in Context, 32 N.Y.U. J. INVL & POL. 291 (2000). For ease
of expression, I sometimes use the term "diversity" to encompass the gambit of such
concerns. Much of the early literature regarding "non-Western" orientations about
human rights focused on social, economic and political preferences regarding the role
of individuals in society and the individual's relationship to government. This
literature emphasizes, for example, socialistic economic relations, the importance of
duties, society's collective interests, "group" oriented social relations, and a rejection
of traditional liberal notions of rights, dominated by individual autonomy. See, e.g.,
JOHN F. COPPER ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS IN POST-MAO CHINA 67-71 (1985); TOM
CAMPBELL, THE LEFT AND RIGHTS: A CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS OF THE IDEA OF
SOCIALIST RIGHTS 2-11, 103-22 (1983); Asmarom Legesse, Human Rights in African
Political Culture, in THE MORAL IMPERATIVES OF HUMAN RIGHTS: A WORLD SURVEY
123-24, 128-30 (Kenneth Thompson ed., 1980).
See generally Donoho, Relativism, supra note 12.
26 See, e.g., RELATIVISM: COGNITIVE AND MORAL (Jack Meiland & Michael
Krausz eds., 1982) (reviewing variations in relativist positions); ALISON RENTELN,
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: UNIVERSALISM VERSUS RELATIVISM 63-65 (1990);
Donoho, Relativism, supra note 12, at 351-52; Michael Perry, Are Human Rights
Universal? The Relativist Challenge and Related Matters, 19 HUm. RTS. Q. 461, 498509 (1997). See also Eric Blumenson, Mapping the Limits of Skepticism in Law and
Morals, 74 TEX. L. REV. 523 (1996) (reviewing and critiquing postmodern
"perspectivism" in American jurisprudence including "neopragmatism" and "cultural
relativism" in the context of human rights).
27 See, e.g., MELVILLE HERSKOVITS, CULTURAL RELATIVISM: PERSPECTIVES IN
CULTURAL PLURALISM 14-15, 56 (1972); ELVIN HATCH, CULTURE AND MORALITY:
THE RELATIVITY OF VALUES IN ANTHROPOLOGY 3-5, 63-81 (1983); Melford Spiro,
Cultural Relativism and the Future of Anthropology, 1 CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY
259, 259-73 (1986) (critiquing various forms of "descriptive relativism").
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constructs dependent on context, the moral validity of any
particular practice, one could argue, should be judged solely
by those internal norms.28
This relativist viewpoint has potential implications for
international human rights ranging from the trivial to the
profound. 2' Taken to its extreme, relativism appears to
2 See HATCH, supra note 27, at 96-101; Spiro, supra note 27, at 260-61;
RENTELN, supra note 26, at 71-72. See also Joan Williams, Rorty, Radicalism,
Romanticism: The Politics of the Gaze, 1992 Wis. L. REV. 131, 134-43 (1992). This
proposition, which might be described as "normative relativism," is the most
significant and critiqued implication of relativist thinking. One common theoretical
critique of normative relativism is that it confuses the "is" with the "ought" in
reaching its position of moral agnosticism. It is often also argued that relativism is
internally incoherent in that its purported agnosticism is itself premised on the
acceptance of a certain moral position; that of toleration of varying moral positions.
See Donoho, Relativism, supra note 12, at 351 n.21. See also Blumenson, supra note
26, at 548-53.
2 The relativist perspective may lend support to government justifications for a
variety of practices that implicate international human rights standards. See, e.g.,
supra notes 7-10. In the area of free speech, for example, alleged social, cultural, or
religious preferences might be used to justify prior restraints, prohibitions against
pornography or liberal rules on libel actions brought by government officials. See,
e.g., Open Door Counseling, Ltd. & Dublin Well Woman Centre, Ltd. v. Ireland, 246
Eur. Ct. H.R. Rep. (ser. A), at 8 (1992) [hereinafter Open Door]; Sunday Times v.
United Kingdom, 30 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1979); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15,
24-26 (1973). See also Bihari Kausikan, An East Asian Approach to Human Rights,
2 BUFF. J. INT'L L. 263, 269-72 (1995); Goodroad, supra note 3, at 259-65. Gender
relations and discrimination have provided even more fertile ground for cultural and
religious based defenses of government endorsed practices. See Sullivan, supra note
7, at 815-54; M. Ghasemi, Islam, InternationalHuman Rights & Women's Equality:
Afghan Women Under Taliban Rule, 8 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 445, 45360 (1999); J. Entelis, InternationalHuman Rights: Islam's Friend or Foe? Algeria as
an Example of the Compatibility of InternationalHuman Rights Regarding Women's
Equality and Islamic Law, 20 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 1251, 1251-55 (1997); Abdullahi
An-Na'im, Religious Minorities Under Islamic Law and the Limits of Cultural
Relativism, 9 HUM. RTS. Q 1, 3-4 (1987); Abdullahi An-Na'im, Human Rights in the
Muslim World, 3 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 13 (1990). See also Bhinder v. Canadian
National Railway Co. [1985] 2 S.C.R. 561 (Can. S.Ct.) (Sikh refusal to wear hard-hat
instead of traditional turban); Almost 400 GirlsDefy French HeadscarfBan, Reuters
World Service, Jan. 24, 1995, LEXIS, News Library (refusal of French Muslim
schoolgirls to remove headscarves); infra notes 32, 35.
May states maintain
inheritance laws that explicitly prefer males based on customary tribal law or social
practices patterned upon economic relations favoring male providers? Do the
religious and cultural preferences of male-dominated Islamic societies justify gender
segregation, unequal educational opportunities and denial of social liberties such as
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challenge the very foundation of the international human
rights system. In essence, an absolute relativist viewpoint
denies the existence of universal values that transcend
contextual and national boundaries."0 The existence of such
transcendent, universal values, which all individuals are
entitled to solely by virtue of their status as human beings,

is a primary
justification for the internationalization of
31
rights.
It is not surprising that the rise of relativism in human
rights discourse has generated enormous political
controversy and a substantial body of academic literature.
driving? The answers to these questions have profound implications for both
individuals and societies worldwide.
See, e.g., A. Bozeman, Law, Human Rights, and Culture, in MORAL
IMPERATIVES, supra note 4, at 25-29. Nearly everyone, it seems, agrees that there
are some universally shared values and prohibitions. See infra note 81 and
accompanying text.
:" See, e.g., Catherine Powell, Symposium, Celebrationof the FiftiethAnniversary
of the Universal Declarationof Human Rights, 30 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 201,
202-03 (1999); Donoho, Relativism, supra note 12, at 356-60; Rhoda Howard,
Dignity, Community, and Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA: CROSSCULTURAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 4, at 81. See also Oscar Schachter, Human
Dignity as a Normative Concept, 77 AM. J. INTL L. 848 (1983).
Some of this literature continues to focus on the theoretical un-soundness of
relativism. See, e.g., Blumenson, supra note 26; Perry, supra note 26; John J. Tilley,
Cultural Relativism, 22 HUM. RTS. Q. 501 (2000). See also Fernando Tes6n,
InternationalHuman Rights and CulturalRelativism, 25 VA. J. INTL L. 869 (1985);
RENTELN, supra note 26, at 62-87. There is also a significant body of legal literature
that examines relativist claims in light of specific issues such as women's rights and
Islamic doctrine. See supra notes 7, 8, 29; Lama Abu-Odeh, Post-ColonialFeminism
and the Veil: Consideringthe Differences, 26 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1527 (1992); Leila
Sayeh & Adriaen Morse, Islam and the Treatment of Women: An Incomplete
Understanding of Gradualism, 30 TEX- INTIL L.J. 311 (1995). In this context,
feminist writers have produced some of the most thoughtful discourse on the issues
raised by the so-called "relativist challenge." See, e.g., Karen Engle, Female Subjects
of Public InternationalLaw: Human Rights and the Exotic Other Female, 26 NEW
ENG. L. REV. 1509 (1992); Eva Brems, Enemies or Allies? Feminism and Cultural
Relativism as Dissident Voices in Human Rights Discourse, 19 HUM. RTS. Q 136
(1997); Tracy Higgins, Anti-Essentialism,Relativism and Human Rights, 19 HARV.
WOMEN'S L. J. 89 (1996); Hope Lewis, Between Irua and "Female Genital
•
Mutilation":
Feminist Human Rights Discourse and the Cultural Divide, 8 HARV.
HUM. RTS. J. 1 (1995); Nancy Kim, Toward a Feminist Theory of Human Rights:
Straddling the Fence Between Western Imperialism and UncriticalAbsolutism, 25
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 49 (1993); Isabelle R. Gunning, Arrogant Perception,
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Most western human rights scholars are hostile to the
relativist perspective and many have rejected it outright.33
Conversely, many non-Western academics have embraced
seemingly relativist positions, often from the largely
functionalist perspective that international human rights
norms will be respected only when interpreted in ways
consistent with local sensibilities.34 Some feminist scholars,
sensitive to pluralism but wary of the ways in which culture
often oppresses women, have looked for common ground
between the relativist insight and feminist antiessentialism.35 Other scholars have expressly rejected the
World-Traveling and MulticulturalFeminism: The Case of Female Genital Surgeries,
23 COLuM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 189 (1992).
See e.g., Perry, supra note 26, at 471-75, 481-87 (rejecting relativism as it
applies to human rights but suggesting that the argument for pluralism is often
confused with relativism); Blumenson, supra note 26, at 523, 547-66, 574-76
(critiquing the relativist implications of Richard Rorty's pragmatic antifoundationalism); Bayefsky, supra note 11, at 55-58; Johan van der Vyver,
Universality and the Relativity of Human Rights: American Relativism, 4 BUFF.
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 43 (1998). The debate over relativism in international human
rights is reflective of, and similar to, the continuing philosophical debate over the
implications of post-modern thinking, including anti-foundationalism, pragmatism,
anti-essentialism and the aftermath of legal realism. In this sense, the work of
philosophers such as Richard Rorty, Martha Nussbaum, Stanley Fish, Michel
Foucault and Joan Williams provide useful insights on the role of cultural diversity
in development of legal norms, including human rights. See generally, Blumenson,
supra note 26.
31 See, e.g., Abdullahi An-Na'im, What do We Mean by Universal?,
23
CENSORSHIP INDEX 120 (1994); A. al-Hibri, Islam, Law and Custom: Redefining

Muslim Women's Rights, 12 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POLY 1, 3-4 (1997) (emphasizing
the importance of an internal critique in the development of human rights norms in
light of cultural imperatives); Daniel Bell, The East Asian Challenge to Human
Rights: Reflections on an East/West Dialogue, 18 HUM. RTs. Q. 641, 656-60 (1996).
See also Abu-Odeh, supra note 32, at 1530-38; RENTELN, supra note 26, at 68-87

(favoring the development of a relativistic framework for human rights based on
empirically discovered cross-cultural values); Makau wa Mutua, The Ideology of
Human Rights, 36 VA. J. INT'L L. 589, 653-56 (1996) (arguing for the
"multiculturalization" of rights and their need for "cultural legitimacy").
35 See, e.g., Brems, supra note 32, at 136, 141, 154-59, 163-64; Kim, supra note
32, at 65-66, 87-96. See also Engle, Female Subjects, supra note 32, at 1520-28
(critiquing the failure of some feminists to failure to engage women from other
cultures on their own terms); Frances Olsen, Feminism in Central and Eastern
Europe:Risks and Possibilitiesof American Engagement, 106 YALE L. J. 2215. 222229 (1997) (discussing how the cultural premises of western feminists color their
orientation toward perceived harmful cultural practices elsewhere).

20011

UNIVERSAL RIGHTS AND DIVERSITY

405

"universal versus relative" rights framework, seeking
alternative ways in which to examine the issues of
diversity.36 Still others have criticized the obvious "statist"
orientation of the political debate over relativism and its
failure to address the nuanced parameters of issues
involving culture, diversity, and oppression."
Many academics have recognized, sometimes implicitly,
that the debate over relativism and universal human rights
need not be cast in "either/or" terms."
These writers
believe that "universal" international human rights may
vary at some level of understanding without undermining
their basic purpose.
For example, the core values
underlying the right to free speech may be universally
shared and preserved even though specific applications of
the right vary among societies. 9
Internationally,
unencumbered political expression might be preserved even
"
See e.g., Diane Otto, Rethinking the 'Universality" of Human Rights Law, 29
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1,17-18, 31-37, 39-40 (1997); Higgins, supra note 32, at
91-92, 97-98, 121-24 (suggesting "international feminist theory" as an alternative
vision for accommodating diverse contextual understandings of rights with an
emphasis on cross-cultural dialogue). See also Gunning, supra note 32, at 197-205;
Lewis, suprq note 32, at 43-55.
37 See, e.g., Horn, supra note 23, at 209-14 (1996). See also Leti Volpp, Talking
"Culture": Gender, Race, Nation, and the Politicsof Multiculturalism,96 COLUM. L.
REV. 1573, 1576-81, 1611-16 (1996); Abu-Odeh, supra note 32, at 1528-31; Otto,
supra note 36, at 13-15 (suggesting that the debate over relativism reflects the
continuing geopolitical struggle between competing economic and political interests);
Engle, Culture and Human Rights, supra note 24, at 314-15, 331-32 (suggesting that
role of economic and political interests underlying the "Asian values" debate has
been overlooked).
38 See authorities cited in supra note 34. See also Gunning, supra note 32, at
191-93, 198-205 (espousing a multi-cultural dialogue approach to cultural conflicts
in human rights); Richard Falk, Cultural Foundations for the International
Protectionof Human Rights, in CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 4, at 44,
45-54; Donoho, Relativism, supra note 12, at 386-91; Jack Donnelly, Cultural
Relativism and UniversalHuman Rights, 6 HUM. RTS. Q. 400, 407-09 (1984).
This line of thinking would similarly define a category of uncontested human
rights as universal and essential. Outside of this "core" of universals, where real
consensus over meaning is lacking, rights would be subject to more extensive
contextual variations. See infra notes 76-82, 187-96 and accompanying text. One
might describe this latter variation as the "core/periphery" argument. See Brems,
supra note 32, at 147.
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if some societies chose to severely restrict pornography
while others do not.40
Upon close examination, most of this "middle ground"
literature reveals endorsement of a relativist perspective, if
at all, solely as a means to an end: the promotion of
diversity, pluralism, self-governance, and autonomy.4
Some undoubtedly would promote diversity as a value in its
own right, or simply to preserve cultural or religious
traditions." For many others, the priority is to stave off the
relentless and seemingly inevitable domination by Western
liberal values. 3 Most writers stress the importance of local
cultural expression and decisionmaking and argue that
human rights must evolve contextually in order to be
meaningful."

40

See supra note 3; infra note 192.

This approach is consistent with and

complimented by the arguments presented by those advocating cross-cultural
dialogue and the development of human rights standards from the perspective of
local cultures. See An-Na'im, What do We Mean, supra note 34, at 121-22, 126;
Gunning, supra note 32, at 197-205; RENTELN, supra note 26, at 61-62, 68-87. See
also Panikkar, supra note 18, at 75-79, 93-94 (cross-cultural "homeomorphic
equivalent").
41 See, e.g., Kausikan, An East Asian Approach, supra note 29,
at 266 (making
this observation regarding the so-called "Asian challenge" to international human
rights).
42 Any nostalgic attempt to freeze cultural practices in the status quo seems
largely at odds with the international human rights system's fundamental purpose
of seeking progressive improvement in the human condition through change. It also
fails to recognize that cultural traditions are not value- or impact-neutral but rather
often oppress and thwart the development of full human dignity for some members
of a society. See infra note 65; Higgins, supra note 32, at 91; Rhoda Howard,
Women's Rights in English Speaking Sub-Saharan Africa, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND
DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA 58-61 (Claude Welch & Ronald Melzner eds., 1984). It also
ignores the fact that cultures are not homogeneous or constant but rather
contestable, fluid and evolutionary. See, e.g., infra note 77.
Kausikan, Asia's Different Standard, supra note 18, at 26, 34-41; Mutua,
supra note 34, at 589, 598, 653-55; Y. Ghai, supra note 21, at 1096 (noting the strong
element of nationalism and resistance to western hegemony that underlies the
"Asian values" movement in human rights). For a provocative perspective on this
"clash" between Western and non-Western values and cultures, see Samuel
Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations, FOREIGN AFFAIRS 22-41 (1993).
44 In contrast to the political agenda of some ardently relativist states, see infra
note 47, the primary thrust of most relativist leaning scholarship focuses on self-
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What is clear, however, is that one need not endorse
"relativism" per se or its implications in order to argue that
some degree of diversity in our understanding, application,
and appreciation of certain international human rights is
necessary or good.45 This is particularly true when the
issues are viewed from a legal rather than purely
philosophical perspective. Ultimately, the real issue is not
legitimacy of relativism but rather the degree to which
diversity, pluralism, self-governance, and autonomy values
will be accounted for within the international human rights
system.
II. THE RHETORIC OF RELATIVISM AND UNIVERSALISM AT THE
WORLD CONFERENCE

The rhetorical power of the relativist position to ward off
international critique has not been lost on repressive
governments. Primarily an academic debate during its
early stages, relativism has increasingly become a staple
component of oppression's rhetorical arsenal. The debate
over relativism came to the political forefront during the
1993 U.N. World Conference on Human Rights held in
Vienna, Austria.
Prior to the Conference, Asian
governments raised the issue to prominence by declaring in
a preparatory document:
[We] recognize that while human rights are universal
in nature, they must be considered in the context of a
dynamic and evolving process of international normsetting, bearing in mind the significance of national
and regional particularities and various historical,
cultural and religious backgrounds ....Human rights
must take into account a nation's historical
governance, multiculturalism, and pluralism in the development of human rights
standards. See supra notes 18, 24, 34,40. See also Perry, supra note 26, at 471-75,
481-87 (distinguishing relativism from pluralism).
45 See infra text accompanying notes 83-101.
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background and culture. Western-based "international"
human rights threatens Asia's right to sovereignty and
right to development ....

During the World Conference itself, many non-Western
nations (and a host of repressive governments)47 pressed
their view that the meaning of human rights is relative to
the social and political context in which the rights are
applied.48 Western nations saw this as an attack on the
validity of international human rights and mounted a
vigorous defense of "universality. '49 The political rhetoric
surrounding the debate reached its zenith in the hyperbole
of U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher's sound bite:

46

Final Declaration of the Regional Meeting for Asia of the World Conference on

Human Rights, Apr. 2, 1993, art. 8, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/ASRM/8-A/CONF.
157/PC/59, [hereinafter Bangkok Declaration]. Other regional meetings were held
for Africa and South America. The regional meeting for Africa was held in Tunis
from November 2-6, 1992. This meeting adopted a declaration containing language
similar to that endorsed in Bangkok. See U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/AFRM/14A/CONF.157/PC/57; Tunis Declaration Item 5 (1992)) ("... no ready-made model
can be prescribed at the universal level since the historical and cultural realities of
each nation and the traditions, standards and values of each people cannot be
disregarded.").
47 These states included Bangladesh, China, Colombia, Cuba, Indonesia, Iran,
Iraq, Libya, Myanmar, Pakistan, Singapore, Syria, Sudan, and Yemen. See Mayer,
supra note 7, at 372-73; Bayefsky, supra note 11, at 45-47. Support for incorporating
considerations of culture and context in the implementation of human rights is,
however, not limited to such states. See supra at 46-52. Indeed, 34 Asian states
signed on to the Bangkok Declaration and 42 African states endorsed Tunis. See
supra note 46; infra note 57.
48 See Mayer, supra note 7, at 372-79 (describing how these
arguments unfolded at
the Vienna World Conference). Yang Xiyu, a member of China's delegation, clearly
expressed the "relativist position" as follows: "Who can say which is the best? We
should allow people to think about human rights in different ways.., we should follow
national conditions, situations and uniqueness." Melanne Civic, A Comparative
Analysis of International and Chinese Human Rights Law-Universality Versus
CulturalRelativism, 2 BUFF. J. INTL L. 285, 320-21 (1996) (quoting Yang Xiyu).

4 Elaine Sciolino, U.S. Rejects Notion That Human Rights Vary With Culture,
N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 1993, at Al. See also Christian Cerna, Universality of Human
Rights and CulturalDiversity: Implementation of Human Rights in Different SocioCultural Contexts, 16 HUM. RTS. Q. 740, 741 (1994).
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'We cannot let cultural relativism become the last refuge of
repression.""
The political posturing in Vienna ultimately resulted in
endorsement of potentially conflicting positions in the
Conference's Final Declaration. With ambiguity typical of
diplomatic compromise, the Final Declaration endorses the
universality of international human rights but suggests
recognition of diverse social, political, and religious
"particularities" in their interpretation:
All human rights are universal, indivisible and
interdependent and interrelated. The international
community must treat human rights globally in a fair
and equal manner, on the same footing, and with the
same emphasis. While the significance of national and
regional particularities and various historical, cultural
and religious backgrounds must be borne in mind, it is
the duty of States, regardless of their political,
economic and cultural systems, to promote and protect
all human rights and fundamental freedoms.
This language of compromise is couched in purposefully
vague terminology that has allowed both Western
universalists and non-Western relativist governments to
claim victory even if no one really knows or agrees about its
actual meaning.
The ambiguity of the Declaration's
language has met with similarly contrasting interpretations
from the academic community.
Depending upon the
reader's perspective, the Declaration either conclusively
establishes the universality of international human rights"
5 See Sciolino, supra note 49, at Al.
5' Vienna Declaration, supra note 5, at para. 5.
62 See Brems, supra note 32, at 151, 154; Jack Donnelly, Post-Cold War
Reflections on the Study of InternationalHuman Rights, 8 ETHICS & INTERNATIONAL
AFFAIRS 97, 113 (1994). See also Michael Davis, Human Rights in Asia: China and
the "Bangkok Declaration,"2 BUFF. J. INT'L L. 215, 226-28 (1996); Philip Alston, The
Best Interests Principle:Towards A Reconciliation of Culture and Human Rights, 8
INT'L J. OF LAW & FAM. 1, 9 (1994) (arguing that Vienna unequivocally endorses
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or represents a serious and troubling disintegration of that
concept at the behest of repressive governments.53 As
discussed below, it is probably neither. 4
Although parsing diplomatic double-speak is perhaps a
fool's errand, it is important to account for the overall
implications of the Declaration's seemingly conflicting
directives. In this regard, one must examine closely the
impulses that prompted such language and its practical
implications. The next section attempts to unpack the
potential meaning of the Declaration's suggestion that
rights may be simultaneously universal and diverse, by
evaluating more closely the impulses that motivated its
adoption. As discussed below, the Declaration's language
reflects both divisions within the international community
as well as potential directions for the future development of
human rights law.
III.

DECIPHERING VIENNA:
SIMULTANEOUSLY UNIVERSAL AND DIVERSE

The Vienna Conference's Final Declaration emphatically
declares that international human rights are universal.5
Yet, it suggests at the same time that cultural and religious
"particularities... must be borne in mind... ."
On one
universality but only turns back the "crudest" relativist arguments).
"3See Bayefsky, supra note 11, at 44-45, 53; Engle, Culture and Human Rights,
supra note 24, at 321-24; Pollis, supra note 11, at 331-32. See also Civic, supra note
48, at 321 (concluding that the debate "rages on" unresolved after the Vienna World
Conference).
54 See infra text accompanying notes 70-83.
The level of generality at which
commentators and politicians alike usually make observations about the
"universality" of rights often makes it difficult to assess the merits of their positions.
See infra notes 103-10.
'5 Paragraph 1 of the Vienna Declaration asserts that the "Universal nature of
these rights and freedoms is beyond question." Vienna Declaration, supra note 5, at
para. 1. What this specifically means, particularly in light of competing language
regarding national "particularities," remains an open question. See infra text
accompanying notes 69-82.
r Vienna Declaration, supra note 5, at para. 5.
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level, this language could be understood simply as a
political compromise, sufficiently vague in its expression to
allow both sides to pretend victory. It is probably a
mistake, however, simply to dismiss it on those grounds.
The use of this ambiguous compromise language, which has
been frequently repeated," reveals the parameters of a
critical battle over the future shape of international human
rights and the varied motivations of governments, human
rights institutions and advocates.

57 See, e.g., ASEAN, Kuala Lumpur Declaration on Human Rights, Sept. 1993,
preamble, art. 7 (reiterating the Bangkok Declaration), reprinted in Arthur M.
Weisburd, The Significance and Determination of Customary InternationalHuman
Rights Law, 25 GA. J. INTL & COMP. L. 99 app., at 144 (1996). The Final
Declaration of the Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing repeated and
expanded upon the ambiguous language of Vienna. UNITED NATIONS, FOURTH
WORLD CONFERENCE ON WOMEN: ACTION FOR EQUALITY, DEVELOPMENT AND
PEACE; BEIJING DECLARATION AND PLATFORM FOR ACTION, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.177/20 (1995) at 5, 108 (reiterating the language of Vienna and adding that
"full respect for various religious and ethical values, cultural backgrounds and
philosophical convictions of individuals and their communities should contribute to
the full enjoyment by women of their human rights" while at the same time calling
for the eradication of "harmful cultural practices" affecting women). A more recent
example of how some States have chosen to deploy cultural diversity in arguments
over international standards occurred during meetings of the Preparatory Commission
on the International Criminal Court. During the third meeting of the Preparatory
Committee, eleven member states of the Arab League sought to exclude certain
crimes of sexual and gender violence from the definition of crimes against humanity
when committed within family life. See WOMEN'S CAUCUS FOR GENDER JUSTICE
ACTION ALERT, at http://www.iccwomen.org/icc/pc199912/alert.htm (Dec. 1, 1999)
(resisting the exclusions sought by the Arab League). Commenting on their
proposal, these states emphasized the need to account for cultural diversity in
defining the elements of crimes. Fearing, for example, that women working at home
could claim "enslavement" within Art. 7(l)(c)(iii) of the Rome Statute they sought to
exclude, based on religious and cultural grounds, all crimes of sexual violence and
persecution that are allegedly committed within the family. See Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court, opened for signature July 17, 1998, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.183/9*; Nizkor English Service Electronic Message, Feb. 8, 2000, on file
with author; Lawyer's Committee for Human Rights, Press Briefing of the NGO
Coalition for an International Criminal Court (Dec. 9, 1999), at http'//
www.lchr.org/icc/iccl299.htm. This effort resulted in proposed compromise language
that would limit the Court's jurisdiction to sexual crimes in which "state or non-state
entit[ies] 'actively promote or encourage' the crime." WOMEN'S CAUCUS REPORT, at
http://www.iccwomen.org/reports/ marpaneleng.htm (last visited Sept. 18, 2001).
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From the perspective of Western states and most
advocacy groups, the impulse to declare rights universal is
easily understood.
One of the philosophical premises
underlying the international system is the presumed
existence of shared universal values that transcend the
nation-state. 8
Without such universal values, a
comprehensive
international
human
rights system
involving monitoring and enforcement mechanisms makes
little sense. Moreover, variability in the specific meaning of
rights greatly complicates, if not compromises, advocacy of
any particular position.
Consequently, human rights
advocates naturally contend that there is a universal,
uniform meaning to the rights they defend. It is at least
modestly troubling to some that this universal meaning
inevitably turns out to correspond directly with the
normative heritage of the West.59 Although pervasively
ethnocentric,
this
phenomenon
stems
from
an
understandable belief that our own rights values have
enormous benefits for all human beings. ° The widespread
8 See, e.g., Donoho, Relativism, supra note 12, at 356-60; Abdullahi An-Na'im,
Human Rights and Islamic Identity in France and Uzbekistan: Mediation of the
Local and Global, 22 HUM. RTS. Q. 906, 907-08 (2000).
'9The current catalogue of international human rights clearly reflects a Western
ideological heritage. See generally Mutua, supra note 34, at 605-06; Pollis &
Schwab, supra note 18, at 1-14. See also Kausikan, Asia's Different Standard,supra
note 18, at 26, 34. Western governments are quite capable of using the banner of
human rights for cynical purposes. See Aryeh Neier, The New Double Standard,
1996 FOREIGN POL'Y 91 (1996); Makau wa Mutua, Looking Past the Human Rights
Committee: An Argument for De-MarginalizingEnforcement, 4 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 211, 245-52 (1998) [hereinafter Matua, Looking Past]. It seems indisputable,
however, that on some level the existing framework of international norms reflects
basic values in which Western governments and advocates believe deeply.
60 The belief that one's own values are the only true values and are valid for
everyone is described by anthropologists as ethnocentrism. The process by which
this occurs is called "enculturation." See HATCH, supra note 27, at ch. 1.
Confronting claims of ethnocentrism, some academics have unabashedly embraced
the Western, liberal orientation of the existing international human rights system as
a superior model for improving the human condition. See, e.g., Jack Donnelly,
Human Rights and Human Dignity: An Analytic Critique of Non-Western
Conceptions of Human Rights, 76 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 303 (1982). This argument
commonly suggests that Western rights notions are functionally required to protect
people everywhere from the oppressive power of the modern, industrialized,
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popular acceptance of many Western-oriented international
human rights norms, at least as generally stated
abstractions, 6 demonstrates the merit of this belief."
On the other side of the debate, reliance on relativism by
non-Western states and scholars reflects a mixture of
contrasting motives. For some repressive regimes, the lure
of relativism undoubtedly lies in its potential for deflecting
Universalists' deep suspicion
international scrutiny.
regarding the motives of those who champion relativism
Indeed, prominent among states
seems well founded.
promoting relativism at the World Conference in Vienna
were those on the short list of the World's most egregious
violators-measured on virtually any scale-of basic human
dignity. 3 Only a true Pollyanna would fail to suspect that
many of these government's espoused claims of cultural or

bureaucratic state. Id. at 311-12; Howard, Dignity, Community and Human Rights,
in CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 31, at 81. See also Reza Afshari, An
Essay on Islamic CulturalRelativism in the Discourse of Human Rights, 16 HUM.
RTS. Q. 235, 248-52 (1994); Thomas M. Franck, Is Personal Freedom a Western
Value?, 91 AM. J. INTL L. 593, 624-27 (1997). But see Samuel Huntington, The West:
Unique, Not Universal, 75 FOREIGN AFF., Nov.-Dec. 1996, at 28, 29-35, 37
(responding to the idea that modernity requires the universalization of Western
culture by pointing out that Western liberal ideology preceded the modern industrial
state, and that cultural imperialism runs counter to Western moral values of selfdetermination, democracy, and pluralism).
61 Most international human rights are expressed in very general and abstract
terms. See Donoho, The Role of Human Rights, supra note 1, at 839. This
abstraction allows diverse states with divergent views on the specific meaning of
rights to join international human rights treaties in the first instance. Agreement
over such abstract and generally stated norms tells us very little about the actual
depth of agreement regarding what those rights will mean to different societies in
Although most domestically created civil or
their concrete manifestations.
constitutional rights norms are stated in similarly abstract terms, domestic legal
systems typically are capable of developing the concrete meaning of such rights
through processes of authoritative interpretation and application which the
international system lacks. See id. at 843; infra notes 110-39 and accompanying
text.
' The acceptance of abstractly stated rights norms does not, however, answer
critical questions regarding the existence or development of consensus over their
See infra notes 71, 102-10 and
more specific and concrete applications.
accompanying text. See also Donoho, Relativism, supra note 12, at 368-69, 382-86.
6 See supra note 47.
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religious imperative are nothing more than cynical
manipulations meant to undermine the effectiveness of
rights.
Yet the appeal of relativism is hardly limited to
repressive
governments.
Especially
among nonWesterners, arguments about relativism are a reflection of
something far more profound than the misleading,
"either/or" dichotomy of universal versus relative rights.
For many, the appeal of a seemingly relativist perspective
is simply a means to advocate genuine concern over the
cultural, social, and political domination of Western
values.64 It similarly reflects an understandable desire to
preserve local traditions and values-a desire that on some
level clearly conflicts with progressive human rights
development and may serve as the unwitting ally of
oppression. 65 Finally, the relativist perspective may be used
to promote self-governance and autonomy-the prerogative
to develop the specific meaning of human rights, in
accordance with local terms of reference. 66 To a significant
extent, genuine concerns for diversity, pluralism and local
autonomy have been obscured by the West's legitimate fear
that "relativism" could serve as the "last refuge for
oppression." 7 The "relativist" label has thus become, in the
6 See supra note 43. See also Kausikan, Asia's Different Standard,supra note
18, at 26, 31; Mutua, supra note 34, at 641-46.

" Cherished cultural traditions very often perpetuate oppressive conditions in
society, sometimes in subtle ways not generally recognized by its members. See
supra note 42. There is perhaps no greater example of this phenomenon than that of
women. See, e.g., Arati Rao, The Politics of Gender and Culture in International
Human Rights Discourse, in WOMEN'S RIGHTS, HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL
FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES 167, 169 (Julie Peters & Andrea Wolper eds. 1995); infra
note 140 (describing provisions in CEDAW requiring states to eliminate harmful

cultural practices). The Final Declaration of the Fourth World Conference on
Women held in Beijing clearly reflects recognition of the potential harmful effects of
cultural traditions on the lives of women and female children. See supra note 57.
66 See, e.g., Kausikan, An East Asian Approach, supra note 29, at 264, 272.
67 See supra note 50.
Reliance on relativism to express these concerns for

cultural diversity, self-governance, and autonomy in human rights is probably
misplaced. Some might even suggest that relativism has now become a "boogey
man," to which the West has dramatically overreacted to ensure the domination of
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words of Makau Wa Mutua, a bit like "human rights nameIn this sense, the fears and corresponding
calling." "
rhetoric of the West have created a misleading oppositional
narrative that obscures the real and difficult issues that
genuine diversity poses for the international human rights
system. 69
As is often true in political debates, the competing
motivations of universalist and relativist governments have
been manifested in arguments imprecisely cast in
"either/or" terms; that is, all rights are, in all of their
Yet one
manifestations, either universal or relative.
plausible reading of the compromise language of the Vienna
Declaration suggests that this is a false dichotomy. Rather,
it may be that the Vienna Declaration reflects the notion
that international human rights can be simultaneously
universal and variant.
The meaning of this suggestion is not, however, selfevident. How is it possible that international human rights
social
and
cultural
diverse
acknowledge
may
"particularities" and still be universal in any meaningful
sense?" Does it mean that some rights are universal while
western values under the banner of universal rights. See Kausikan, The Ideology,
supra note 29, at 267-68, 279 (describing Western "over-reaction" to the "simple
description of reality" in the Bangkok Declaration as a reflection of insecurity over
values and a reaction to Asian's failure to "become good [WIesterners .....
3 See Mutua, The Ideology, supra note 34, at 598.
6 Diane Otto has pointed out that the debate over relativism also reflects and
obscures a deeper ideological, economic and political struggle between North and
South over "Truth" and dominance in a post-cold war era. Otto, supra note 36, at
15-18. See also Kausikan, An EastAsian Approach, supra note 29, at 279-83; Engle,
Culture and Human Rights, supra note 24, at 314-15, 331-32.
70 From a theoretical, philosophical perspective, a common answer from
academics is that rights, as a manifestation of moral values, are either universal or
relative to context, but not both. See, e.g., supra note 32. The detailed and
exhaustive literature debating the theoretical and philosophical possibility of
universal truths, long pre-dating the modern human rights system, perhaps reveals
the pragmatic futility of such discourse. Equally cogent and exquisitely reasoned
arguments have been presented on both sides of the issue of "universal truths" for
literally hundreds of years. Such abstract expositions illuminate, but are incapable
of resolving on theoretical terms alone, the practical political conflict that underlies
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others are not? Does it mean that a variety of culturally
specific interpretations of a given right may nevertheless
satisfy a state's legal obligation to recognize and enforce it?
These suggestions raise, in turn, other troubling questions.
For example, does not acknowledgement of contextual
variability in rights thwart their progressive development
and potential for inducing dynamic change?
Does it
eliminate the transcendent quality of rights that renders
them functionally meaningful? Does not such variability
necessarily rest upon the untenable premise that some
human beings are entitled to less or more protection based
on the arbitrary circumstances of their birth? Is a woman
born in Saudi Arabia less deserving of personal liberty,
freedom of expression, and autonomy than a woman born in
Western Europe? The mixture of motives underlying the
debate, and the compromise language it produced in
Vienna, provide useful insights about possible answers to
such questions. It is essential in this regard to move
beyond the highly generalized and abstract terms that have
characterized the political debate.
A. What is Meant By "UniversalRights"?
There are, of course, different possible specific
interpretations to the general position that rights are
universal. For some this may undoubtedly mean that even
the most specific applications of all rights are the same for
all people under all circumstances. Under this view, rights
must be uniform in meaning, content, and application in
order to be "universal." For example, the international
right to privacy either includes protection for homosexual
relations within the privacy of the home, or it does not. The
the debate. Some legal academics, particularly feminist legal scholars, have been
flexible and pragmatic in their treatment of the issues, often suggesting that an
accommodation of cultural variation within "universal" rights is both possible as a
legal matter, and functionally desirable. See authorities cited in supra notes 31, 32,
34.
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answer to this question does not depend upon social,
cultural, or religious preferences, or circumstances
prevailing in the defendant state. The meaning of
71 privacy is
uniform even in its most specific manifestations.
This absolutist position regarding universality appears
largely untenable. First, if nothing else, the history of the
debate and the compromises reflected in pronouncements,
like the Vienna Declaration, make it abundantly clear that
a great many people and governments simply do not share
this view of universality.7 Second, an absolutist position
appears highly impractical, if not counterproductive, to the
promotion of effective and meaningful international human
rights.7' Finally, an absolutist approach tends to promote a
widely unwelcome and undesirable homogenization of
peoples and cultures. Given the enormous dominance and
proselytizing nature of modern Western culture, it is, in
this regard, implicitly ethnocentric. If rights are to have
7' A formalistic legal argument for this position could be developed based on the
existence of state consent to human rights treaties. One could argue, for example,
that treaty ratification obligates each state party to protect and implement the
rights "as declared" in the treaty text. This view, however, simply begs the question
about what the rights "as declared" actually mean and what the state parties have
in fact consented to when ratifying the text. See Henry J. Steiner, Political
Participationas a Human Right, 1 HARV. HUM. RTS. Y.B. 77, 80-93 (1989); infra
note 110. Treaty rights are typically stated as general abstractions and are, like all
legal principles, essentially indeterminate in meaning. See Steiner, supra, at 77-86;
Martti Koskenniemi, The Future of Statehood, 32 HARV. INT'L L.J. 397, 399-400,
405-06 (1991); Mark Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1363, 1371-82
(1984); Donoho, The Role of Human Rights, supra note 1, at 839-47. The mere
existence of an agreement to "promote" or "render effective" free speech, tells us
almost nothing about what that obligation actually entails since "free speech" is an
entirely malleable concept that gains meaning only through interpretation and
application. See infra text accompanying notes 103-11. One might reasonably
argue, of course, that the obligations created by the treaty include a promise to abide
by whatever interpretations the international community subsequently arrives at
regarding the specific meaning of the rights. Although theoretically plausible, this
view does not comport well with the existing structure of the international human
rights system, the authority given to its institutions, or typical treaty text. It also
seems at least doubtful that state parties actually intended this result. See infra
note 109.
72 See supra notes 41-69 and accompanying text.
7 See infra text accompanying notes 84-92.
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singular meanings and uniform content across the wide
spectrum of world cultures and political systems, then
someone's view of that meaning and content must prevail 4
There seems little doubt under current circumstances that
any such "uniform content" is expected to follow AngloEuropean traditions and not those of Islamic, Asian, or
developing world societies."
Western sensibilities,
disguised as universal human rights, are promoted at the
cost of genuine diversity, pluralism, self-governance, and
local autonomy.
Alternatively, non-absolutist conceptions of the term
"universal" are both possible and less objectionable
internationally. The drive toward universality rests, in its
best light, on the premise that there are transcendent
values that all human beings need, share, and are entitled
to enjoy."
The universality of such values and their
embodiment as abstract human rights norms does not itself
imply uniformity in their specific manifestations in every
context. 7
In essence, there may be various specific
", The more specific the call for uniformity becomes, the more likely it is to
reflect ethnocentric dogma. If a particular application of a right preserves the core
value of a human right, the position that another specific alternative application
should be preferred may often reflect nothing more than ethnocentric bias favoring
one's own way of doing business. See supra note 60.
'r See, e.g., Mutua, The Ideology, supra note 34 (arguing that international
human rights law and discourse is virtually tautological with Western liberal
ideology). See also supra notes 4, 18, and 59-60.
7" This is not to say, of course, that there are no rights that in fact have uniform
specific content under all circumstances.
Most alleged relativists readily
acknowledge and embrace the notion that a "core" of universal and uniform rights
already exists. See, e.g., Kausikan, Asia's Different Standard, supra note 18, at 34.
Indeed, there may be many such rights (prohibition of torture, genocide, summary
execution, among others) and recognition of others will undoubtedly develop over
time. See infra note 81 and accompanying text.
" Thus, when read in conjunction with the reference to "particularities," the
Vienna Declaration's admonition that "all States" have a duty to protect "all human
rights," leaves open the question of how such rights may be manifested in divergent
societies. See supra note 51 and accompanying text. In this regard, it is important
to bear in mind that the specific meaning of most domestically protected rights
within Western societies are continually contested and altered through social, legal,
and political processes.
Thus, the meaning and specific implications of the
Constitutional right of privacy in the United States is not uniformly embraced
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applications of a right that, while producing divergent
outcomes, nevertheless preserves the core human rights
value over which international consensus exists. In this
sense, the Vienna Declaration's emphasis on universality
might simply stand as a strong endorsement of the view
that there exists consensus over a core of human rights
values that must be universally protected by all
governments that have promised to uphold them.78 The
competing reference to "particularities" correspondingly
implies that divergent applications, interpretations, and
outcomes may satisfy this core obligation. There is, if you
will, more than one way to 'skin' the human rights 'cat.'
B. What is Meant by BearingNational"Particularities"
in
Mind?
Different understandings may also be given to the Vienna
Declaration's directive that the diversity of human culture
must be borne in mind. To some, this may imply that
certain rights are not applicable in certain societies.
Repressive governments may similarly suggest that it
delegitimizes international scrutiny or external pressure to
change existing social practices. Such extreme views are
clearly inconsistent with the basic concept of international
rights and the entire structure of the existing international
within American society. Groups of differing social, cultural and religious
orientations continually press their view of that right in the political and legal
arenas. See infra notes 87, 107. In this fashion, rights are often the vocabulary used
to mediate social and cultural clashes within a pluralistic society. See infra text
accompanying notes 144-52.
78 The natural law oriented argument that such universal values apply to states
that have not obligated themselves in a formal legal sense remains problematic. The
international legal order remains state centric and largely positivist despite
increasing inroads into traditional sovereignty and changes in our concepts of world
order. See infra note 92. See generally Louis Henkin, That "S" Word: Sovereignty,
Globalization and Human Rights, Et Cetera, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1 (1999); Jack
Goldsmith, Sovereignty, InternationalRelations Theory, and InternationalLaw, 52
STAN. L. REV. 959 (2000) (reviewing STEPHEN D. KEASNER, Sovereignty: Organized
Hypocrisy (1999)).
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human rights system.79 They are also inconsistent with the
universal rights language prominently emphasized in the
Vienna Declaration and in over fifty years of human rights
development."
If nothing else, the almost obsessive
reiteration of the "universality" of human rights in
international instruments lays to rest these extreme claims.
Nearly all governments and societies appear to believe it
indisputable that universal human rights values exist, have
been identified as such, and may be developed and
implemented through international efforts. What they
disagree about is precisely how such rights may be
manifested in diverse contexts.
C. Reconciling The Language of Vienna
It is probable, therefore, that the elements of relativist
language in the Vienna Declaration reflect no more than a
widespread desire among non-Western states to manifest
local preferences, preserve a degree of autonomy in the
implementation of rights, and promote diversity values.
Thus, in its best light, such language is motivated by the
idea that the manifestation of human rights must somehow
accommodate
communal preferences
and recognize
diversity and self-governance wherever possible without
violating underlying universal values."'
This position suggests an undefined balance between
universal values and local preferences. At a minimum, the
international
community's
continued
emphasis
on
universality demands that culturally based variations in
See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
80 In this sense, the recognition of universality in Vienna puts to rest the
extreme relativist position that some rights have no applicability whatsoever in
certain societies. Some claim that even the most prominent proponent of this "noninterference" version of relativism, the People's Republic of China, has begun to
concede that a core of universal rights exists on some level and are appropriate
subjects of international concern. See Davis, supra note 52, at 222-29.
8' See supra notes 38-44 and text accompanying infra notes 82-100.
71
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rights must be compatible with, and preserve, core
universal values. It similarly requires that diversity and
autonomy concerns not undermine the progressive
development of human rights or serve as an excuse for
oppression or uncritical preservation of the status quo.
The Vienna Declaration may be seen, therefore, as a
practical compromise among competing motivations. It
essentially directs international institutions to accomplish a
difficult and delicate task-interpret the specific meaning of
rights in ways that allow diversity, self-governance, and
autonomy, while maintaining core, universal human rights
values. In the case of select rights, such as those relating to
the physical integrity of the individual, there may be little
or no room for variation.82 For other rights, there may be
little actual consensus over their specific meaning and
significant potential for variations that nevertheless
For still others, it may
preserve core universal values."
turn out that consensus is lacking even over the supposed
core value represented in the abstract normative standard.
In such cases, the level of shared understanding over
specific meaning may be so shallow as to cast doubt on the
existence of the right itself as a meaningful international
standard.

"2 See supra note 76; Donoho, Relativism, supra note 12, at 377, 387. There are a
variety of ways to identify those rights for which universal consensus over specific
meaning may exist. There are, for example, a number of rights that virtually all
states have endorsed and for which culturally based variations are empirically
implausible. Donoho, supra note 12, at 382 n.141. See also supra note 77. Other
rights have been given some specific content in the treaty text itself (e.g., secret
ballots, segregation of minors from adult criminal defendants, etc.) or subsequent
international declarations. See, e.g., United Nations Declaration on the Protection of
All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture, G.A- Res. 3452, U.N. GAOR, 30th
Sess., Supp. No. 34, at 91, U.N. Doc. A/1034 (1975). Ultimately, a process of
dialogue and debate among governments, advocates, scholars, and international
institutions should progressively develop and expand consensus over the specific,
concrete meaning of rights.
83 See supra notes 3, 39-40 and accompanying text; infra notes 180-95 and
accompanying text.
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While the potential for abuse of this approach leaves most
human rights advocates enormously uncomfortable, 84 it
reflects practical realities and avoids the alternative
dilemma of a homogenizing, Western-dominated, and
absolutist universal position.
First, from a primarily
functional perspective, there is reason to believe that the
effectiveness of human rights ultimately depends, at some
level, on their consistency with the prevailing social,
cultural, and religious traditions of the society in which
they are to be applied."
This does not mean, of course, that individual rights
should be generally defined by popular sentiments. The
very notion of individual rights that has driven the current
system refutes this idea. Protection of individuals from
majoritarian abuse is undoubtedly an important, if not
fundamental, function of many human rights standards.86
The application of human rights to protect individuals from
state action will, however, frequently be unpopular, at least
in functional democracies where the government's actions
are presumably prompted by majoritarian will.
At least within democratic legal systems, rulings that go
against the will of the majority are accepted as binding
"' See supra note 11. Apart from potential abuse by those in power, this
approach may also be criticized for its tendency to undermine progressive
development of rights or reduce rights to their lowest common denominators.
8" See supra notes 34, 40.
This view is itself, of course, subject to an accusation of western bias since it
stresses the autonomy of the individual and a liberal democratic view of government
and society. See, e.g., Mutua, The Ideology, supra note 34, at 640-46, 653-57. See
also supra note 24; Huntington, The West, supra note 60, at 33-34, 37; Franck, Is
PersonalFreedom, supra note 60, at 624-27 (arguing that freedom of conscience and
individual autonomy are part of an emerging civilization of modernity rather than a
domination of Western preferences). It is also, however, implicit in the entire
structure and orientation of the current international system. See Donnelly, Human
Rights, supra note 60, at 304-05, 311-14; Franck, supra note 60, at 594, 626-27. The
prominence of an individualistic conception of rights in the international human
rights system does not, in any case, imply agreement over the appropriate balance
between individual and societal interests. This balance is a critical point of tension
that often serves to mediate claims and defenses based on cultural diversity and selfgovernance. See infra text accompanying notes 145-52, 167-70, 198-209.
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despite their unpopularity.87
Among other important
reasons, this is at least partly because the protections given
minorities are consistent, on some level, with the social and
moral traditions of that society88 and are reached through a
process perceived as legitimate.89
In contrast, the
acceptance of rulings issued by international bodies among
local populations and governments is currently weak at
best." Moreover, the human rights obligations upon which
such decisions rest are not based directly on a domestically
generated source such as a constitution, but rather are
derived from a treaty obligation commonly perceived as
"external" to the body politic. Hostile government officials
will find it easy to resist unpopular interpretations of rights
that are at odds with prevailing social and moral traditions.
Under these circumstances, some level of cultural
consistency will probably be a critical element in the
effective and progressive development of international

87

That unpopular rights (or lack of rights) are accepted as legally binding does

not imply lack of continued political and social contestation. The persistent debates
over abortion rights, sexual orientation, and the death penalty in the United States
are clear examples. See supra note 77; infra note 106.
An important condition in Western societies supporting the acceptance of
unpopular individual liberties is the existence of a "rights consciousness." At least
in liberal democracies, the general acceptance of the notion of individual rights
protections seems to be an important factor both in the creation of effective
institutions and in the acceptance of unpopular individual liberties. See, e.g., infra
notes 214-48 and accompanying text.
0 See generally Alan Hyde, The Concept of Legitimization in the Sociology of
Law, 1983 WIS. L. REV. 379, 387-89, 392-93, 397, 423 (1983) (reviewing and
critiquing theories concerning the role of "legitimacy" in fostering compliance with
domestic legal norms). See also THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY
AMONG NATIONS 19-22, 25-26, 91-96 (1990); Oscar Schacter, Towards a Theory of
InternationalObligation,8 VA. J. INT'L L. 300, 311-12, 314 (1968).
* See Mutua, Looking Past,supra note 59, at 234-36, 239; Donoho, The Role of
Human Rights, supra note 1, at 861-62. Australian reactions to the Toonen decision,
supra note 10, present an interesting reflection of this dynamic. After the U.N.
Human Rights Committee (HRC) declared that a Tasmanian anti-sodomy statute
was contrary to privacy rights under the ICCPR, the Australian popular press
castigated the Australian federal government for "abdicating" sovereignty to an
unaccountable international body rather than for its support of the HRC's
substantive position. See LAW, POLITICS, & MORALS, supra note 19, at 739-41
(providing excerpts).
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human rights standards within domestic legal systems.91
Unless dominant public opinion perceives an international
interpretation of a right to be appropriate (legitimate)
within its own terms of reference, it is unlikely to be
accepted in practice.92
Second, the existing system is already structured,
whether by design or default, to produce significantly
diverse interpretations of rights.
The existence or
nonexistence of a legal obligation to protect rights is itself a
function of popular preferences and governmental
prerogative. Most rights obligations are based on the
positive law of treaties. States are either free to consent to
these obligations or not.9" Even when treaty rights are
consented to, many states' obligations are significantly
tempered by extensive reservations, declarations, and
understandings."
The unfortunate reality is that such
91 See supra note 34. Cultural consistency, or at least sensitivity, will ultimately

also improve the perceived legitimacy of the international decision-maker.
92 See supra notes 34, 40 and accompanying text. This factor most clearly plays
itself out in terms of individual liberties, which currently still dominate
international human rights law. Even within the context of purely domestic civil
liberties, an accommodation has always been necessary between the interests of the
individual and society at large. Prevailing social and cultural preferences are
inevitably considered by legal decisionmakers and balanced against the claimed
interests of the individual right holder. See infra text accompanying notes 145-52,
167-70, 197-203.
" The requirement of state consent to treaty obligations is a fundamental and
persistent precept of international law doctrine.
See, e.g., IAN BROWNLIE,
PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 604-05, 619-20 (3d ed. 1979); Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, adopted May 22, 1969, art. 34, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.39/27, reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679, 693 (1969). See also supra note 78.
Customary international law obligations are not generally thought to be based
strictly on consent, however. It is also clear that neither states nor international
institutions have felt constrained in their scrutiny of human rights situations by the
positivist orientation of international law. See Donoho, Relativism, supra note 12, at
364-67. See also Paul Kahn, American Hegemony and InternationalLaw, Speaking
Law to Power: Popular Sovereignty, Human Rights, and the New International
Order, 1 CHI. J. INT'L L. 1, 11-12 (2000).
9' Although the number of state parties to international human rights treaties
has grown enormously over the last ten years, so has the widespread use of
sweeping reservations that attempt to significantly curtail the specific obligations
accepted. See Henkin, That "S" Word, supra note 78, at 4, 12; Engle, Culture and
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reservations are inevitably designed to eliminate potential
interpretations of rights seen as inconsistent with
municipal law and popular sensibilities.9
Two other important features of the current international
human rights system tend, as a practical matter, to produce
variability in the meaning of rights. First, the international
system is, on nearly all levels, premised on the primacy of
The central
the national implementation of rights.96
obligation created by the major human rights treaties is one
of result. State parties are obligated to "give effect" to the
rights recognized in the treaty through their domestic legal
systems.97 Since rights are inevitably expressed in the most
Human Rights, supra note 24, at 295 (reviewing reservations made by Islamic states
to key provisions of the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against
Women); William Schabas, Reservations to the Convention on the Eliminationof All
Forms of DiscriminationAgainst Women and the Convention on the Rights of the
Child, 3 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN& LAw 79, 91-107 (1997).
' See, e.g., Engle, Culture and Human Rights, supra note 24, at 295-96; Donoho,
Relativism, supra note 12, at 364 n.79. The reservations made by Brunei
Darussalam, Afghanistan, and Djibouti to the Children's Convention are emblematic
of the tendency of states to use reservations to gut their substantive obligations, as
exemplified below:
The Government of Brunei Darussalam expresses its reservations on the
provisions of the said Convention which may be contrary to the Constitution
of Brunei Darussalam and to the beliefs and principles of Islam, the State
religion, and without prejudice to the generality of the said reservations, in
particular expresses its reservation on articles 14, 20 and 21 of the
Convention.
United Nations, Treaty Body Database, at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf (last
visited Dec. 21, 2001); United Nations, The U.N. Treaty Collection, available at
http-/untreaty.un.org(ENGLISH/biblelenglishinternetbible/partI/chapterIV/chapterI
V.asp (last visited Aug. 31, 2001) (providing the text of reservations made by 74 of
the state parties to the Children's Convention). See Convention on the Rights of the
Child, G.A. Res. 25, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc A/RES/44125,
adopted by the U.N. General Assembly Nov. 20, 1989, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 1448
(1989) [hereinafter Children's Convention]. See also infra note 110.
' See, e.g., Christina M. Cerna, East Asian Approaches To Human Rights, 2
BUFF. J. INVL L. 201, 210 (1996); Jack Donnelly, InternationalHuman Rights: A
Regime Analysis, 40 INVL ORG. 599, 613-15 (1986). See also Certain Aspects of the
Laws on the Use of Languages in Education in Belgium, 1 Eur. H.R. Rep. 252, 284
(A/6) (1968) (Convention mechanisms are subsidiary to national implementation of
rights); infra note 167.
E.g., ICCPR, supra note 6, art. 2; ICESCR, supra note 6, art. 2. See also Philip
Alston & Gerard Quinn, The Nature and Scope of States Parties'Obligations Under
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general and indeterminate terms, each state party enjoys
significant interpretive discretion in their initial
implementation of the rights.
Second, international human rights institutions have,
with some important exceptions,98 been created with their
wings carefully clipped so as to ensure a limited role,
largely confined to toothless supervision, monitoring and
promotional activities."
Even where adjudicative-type
functions are allowed, exhaustion of remedies is a
ubiquitous requirement and powers of enforcement are
virtually nonexistent.' 0
When the primacy of national
the InternationalCovenant on Economic, Social and CulturalRights, 9 HUM. RTS. Q.
156, 164-77 (1987); Oscar Schachter, The Obligation to Implement the Covenant in
Domestic Law, in THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS 311 (Lois Henkin ed., 1981).
9" The institutions of the European human rights system have developed into an
important exception to the usual pattern of limited institutional authority and
effectiveness.
See infra notes 216-20 and accompanying text. See generally
Laurence Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Towards a Theory of Effective
SupranationalAdjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273 (1997) (promoting the European
system as a model of effective international adjudication of human rights). The
institutions recently created by the international community to prosecute crimes
against humanity in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda might also be cited as
possible exceptions to this pattern. See, e.g., Panel, War Crimes Tribunals: The
Record and Prospects, 13 AM. U. INT'L REV. 1383 (1998).
9 See Elena A. Baylis, General Comment 24: Confronting the Problem of
Reservations to Human Rights Treaties, 17 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 277, 279-82 (1999);
Donnelly, InternationalHuman Rights, supra note 96, at 613-15; Donoho, The Role
of Human Rights, supra note 1, at 855-68; Mutua, Looking Past, supra note 59, at
216-19, 233-37; Allyn L. Taylor, Globalizationand Biotechnology: UNESCO and an
InternationalStrategy to Advance Human Rights and Public Health, 25 AM. J. L. &
MED. 479, 514-18 (1999).
'00 See, e.g., Mutua, Looking Past, supra note 59, at 235, 239. The decisions of the
European Court for Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights
are both technically "binding." Nevertheless, actual enforcement of the InterAmerican Court's judgments has continued to prove problematic. See, e.g., Holly
Dawn Jarmul, The Effect of Decisions of Regional Human Rights Tribunals on
National Courts, 28 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POLY 311, 317-18 (1997). States have
similarly tended to ignore the recommendations of treaty-based monitoring bodies.
See, e.g., Dana D. Fischer, International Reporting Procedures, in GUIDE TO
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICE 188 (Hurst Hannum ed., 1994); Helfer &
Slaughter, supra note 98, at 345 (noting that the HRC's follow-up process regarding
Optional Protocol decisions received state responses on only 81 out of 154 cases
finding violations and that in only 30 percent of these 81 cases did the state express
a willingness to comply).
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implementation is coupled with this very weak system of
international supervision by institutions without binding
authority, widely diverse interpretations of rights are
inevitable, if not contemplated.
In short, the international system is currently
characterized by a structure that practically ensures wide
diversity in the interpretations of rights. Indeed, it seems
probable that many states, both in negotiating the original
text of treaties and in subsequent ratifications, fully
intended this result in order to preserve sovereign
prerogatives. Taken together, these factors give practical
support to the notion, implicitly expressed in the Vienna
Conference's Final Declaration, that specific applications of
rights may vary by culture and context, so long as core
universal values are preserved.
But what does it mean to say that the specific
manifestations of human rights may sometimes vary by
context and culture so long as universal core values are
protected? A useful answer to this question is not possible
in the abstract. For some rights, like freedom from torture
or summary execution, there is little room for interpretive
variation due to nearly universal consensus over specific
Some rights are simply not
contextual meaning.
susceptible to significant cultural, social, or political
variations. In contrast, there are rights on the opposite end
of the spectrum for which there may be disagreement even
over the presumed universal core value. Agreement over
the definition of "core values" may itself ultimately
determine what specific variations are allowable without
destroying the right. Free speech, for example, may be
defined as narrowly as free political expression relating to
governance, or as broadly as protection for all facets of
human expression, including blasphemous pornography.
Whether pornography, commercial speech, hate speech, or
other inflammatory opinions are protected internationally,
and under what circumstances, depends on one's initial
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view of the "core value" protected by the right to free
speech.1 "1
Answers regarding permissible variations in the
application of rights must, therefore, be worked out through
a
process
of
case-by-case
decisionmaking
and
interpretation, much as it is within domestic legal
systems.0 2 In the human rights context, this process will
inevitably raise delicate questions about international
supervision and the allocation of authority. Tracing out
how and where the task of accommodating diversity, selfgovernance and autonomy may be best accomplished, is the
subject of the next section.
IV. GIVING MEANING TO RIGHTS: MEDIATING CLAIMS OF
DIVERSITY THROUGH CASE-BY-CASE DECISION MAKING AND
INTERPRETATION
Even a casual observer of the international human rights
system will discover a plethora of generally stated, abstract
norms covering most aspects of human behavior." 3 For
101

See, e.g., Kausikan, An East Asian Approach, supra note 29, at 269-72. See

also supra note 3.
102 See infra notes 136-57 and accompanying text.
103 Among the hundreds of international human rights instruments promulgated
under U.N. authority since 1945, there are at least seven major multilateral treaties
with more than one hundred state parties each. As of August 31, 2001, the ICESCR
and ICCPR, supra note 6, and the Conventions on Genocide, Racial Discrimination,
Women, Torture, and Children had 142, 144, 130, 156, 165, 119, and 191 state
parties, respectively. See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide, adopted by the U.N. GeneralAssembly Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S.
277 [hereinafter Genocide Convention]; International Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, adopted by the U.N. General Assembly Dec.
21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (entered into force Jan. 4, 1969) [hereinafter CERD];
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,
adopted by the U.N. GeneralAssembly Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 (entered into
force Sept. 3, 1981) [hereinafter CEDAW]; Convention Against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, adopted by the U.N.
GeneralAssembly Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into force June 26. 1987)
[hereinafter Torture Convention]; Children's Convention, supra note 95;
MILLENNIUM SUMMIT MULTILATERAL TREATY FRAMEWORK, Sept. 6-8, 2000, U.N.
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some governments and human rights advocates, the
existence of this catalogue of generally stated, abstract
norms is frequently the end of the inquiry rather than the
This simplified view, much like vague
beginning.
assertions about "universality,""4 fails to account for a more
complex legal reality. Standing alone, generally stated
abstract norms such as equal protection, privacy, free
speech, or family life are even more indeterminate
internationally than they are within domestic legal
orders. °5 The specific meaning and potential application of
such elastic concepts is simply not self-evident within the
enormously diverse
settings
of the international
community. Indeed, vagueness and abstraction are the
foundations that support widespread adoption of human
rights treaties by widely divergent states in the first
instance, often concealing an underlying lack of consensus
over specific meaning."'
Thus, widespread state agreement to a treaty regime
protecting "privacy"' 7 or respect for "the best interests of
Doc. DPI/2130; U.N. Treaty Collection, supra note 95 (providing the texts of
multilateral human rights treaties promoted under the United Nations). There are
also three comprehensive regional human rights treaties covering a wide variety of
human rights concerns. See infra note 116. See also Richard B. Bilder, An Overview
of InternationalHuman Rights Law, in GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
PRACTICE 4-8 (Hurst Hannum ed., 3d ed., 1999).
o4 See supra notes 54, 61-62, 71.
'05See supra notes 1, 61-62, 71. See also Koskenniemi, supra note 71, at 399-400,
405-06; Alston, supra note 52, at 18. Although the textual indeterminacy of rights
stated solely in abstract terms is manifest, some measure of concrete meaning may
be added through the process of interpretation and application. See infra notes 13538 and accompanying text. There is, however, a deeper level of indeterminacy that
surrounds all legal concepts, even after generations of exegesis by sophisticated legal
processes. Thus, rights discourse in the United States has included a significant
challenge to liberalism's reliance on rights as an instrument of constructive social
change based, at least in part, on their inherent indeterminacy. See, e.g., Tushnet,
supra note 71, at 1363-94. See generally Anthony Chase, The Left on Rights: An
Introduction, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1541, 1553-61 (1984) (summarizing distinct critiques
of rights).
0
See, e.g., Abdullahi An-Nanim, Conclusion, in CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES,
supra note 4, at 431-32; DAvID P. FORSYTHE, HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD POLITICS
32-34, 39, 180 (1983).
107 The right of privacy is recognized in many of the major human rights treaties.
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the child"'' 8 does not by itself imply consensus over whether
such rights protect certain specific behavior." 9 As in
domestic legal systems, the specific meaning of such
abstractions must be developed over time through a process
of interpretation and application. Internationally, such
questions of interpretation involve a complex matrix of legal
and practical considerations including state intent,
institutional mandate, context, and the nuanced interplay
between national implementation and international
supervision."'
In this regard, choices regarding
It is abundantly clear, however, that substantial disagreement exists among (and
within) societies and governments regarding the precise meaning and content of the
right. See supra notes 77, 86. The potential interplay between privacy and sexual
orientation issues provides just one of many examples. See Anita L. Allen, Coercing
Privacy, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 723, 726-27 (1999) (discussing competing visions of
the specific implications of privacy and private choice within the American polity);
Jean L. Cohen, Is There A Duty Of Privacy? Law, Sexual Orientation,And The
Construction Of Identity, 6 TEx. J. OF WOMEN & L. 47, 88-93 (1996); Andrew
Koppelman, Why Gay Legal History Matters, 113 HARv. L. REV. 2035, 2057-58
(2000) (book review) (noting the indeterminacy of the term "privacy," as well as the
likelihood of divergent applications of the concept among U.S. states); Brenda Sue
Thornton, The New InternationalJurisprudenceon the Right to Privacy: A Head-On
Collision With Bowers v. Hardwick, 58 ALB. L. REV. 725, 758-74 (1995);.
"o See, e.g., Alston, supra note 52, at 4-5, 11-15, 17-18; Donoho, The Role of
Human Rights, supra note 1, at 839-47.
'09 See supra notes 61-62, 71, 103 and 104. Compare Toonen v. Australia,
Comm., No. 488/1992, U.N. Doc. CCPR/c50/D/488/1992 (1994); Dudgeon v. United
Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1981); Norris v. Ireland, 142 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser.
A) (1988); and Modinos v. Cyprus, App. No. 15070/89, 67 Eur. Comm. H.R. Dec. &
Rep. 295 (1991) with Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). See generally
Thornton, supra note 107, at 758-74; Clarice B. Rabinowitz, Proposalsfor Progress:
Sodomy Laws and the European Convention on Human Rights, 21 BROOK. J. INT'L L.

425 (1995); Jennifer C. Lukoff, South Africa Takes the Initial Step Towards a
Brilliant Twenty-First Century:A ComparativeStudy of State v. Kampher & Bowers
v. Hardwick, 18 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 459 (1999).
10 See infra notes 162-211 and accompanying text. The degree to which states
have obligated themselves to follow decisions by international monitoring bodies
regarding the meaning of rights is subject to continuing debate. Although such
decisions (e.g., responses to state reports, general comments, and committee views
on individual petitions) are not technically binding, the treaty committees have been
given supervisory functions that would imply some authority to interpret treaty text.
It is clear, however, that many states have not acted as though they consider such
interpretive work authoritative. See supra note 100. In 1994, the HRC boldly
declared in General Comment 24(52) that it had the authority to determine the
validity of state reservations. See Schabas, supra note 94, at 90-95, 109; Robert
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institutional authority and the appropriate methods and
goals of interpretation are critical to the development of the
specific parameters of human rights obligations and
ultimately essential to the debate over their universal
versus variable character."'
InternationalMechanisms for Interpretingthe Meaning of Rights
The process of interpretation and application of
international human rights norms may take place in a
variety of forums and on different levels. Within the
existing international human rights system most of these
are
somewhat
opportunities
for
interpretation
underdeveloped.
Given the primacy of national
implementation,"' the first layer of interpretation will
theoretically be made by national authorities. Like the
proverbial fox in the human rights henhouse, state parties
Rosenstock, Current Development: The Forty-Ninth Session of the InternationalLaw
Commission, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 107, 110 (1998). The HRC also announced that
reservations found invalid, such as the U.S. reservations on the death penalty, were
legally "severable" such that the reserving state was a full party to the treaty as if
no reservation had been entered. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 24,
Nov. 2, 1994, para. 18, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/RevJAdd.6. The International Law
Commission has suggested that this approach is contrary to prevailing international
law. Rosenstock, supra, at 110. ILC legal counsel issued a similar opinion regarding
reservations under CEDAW. Rosenstock at id. (citing 1976 U.N. Jurid. Y.B. 219,
221, U.N. Doc. STILEG/SER.C/14). The United States, United Kingdom, and France
strongly objected to the HRC's position and have indicated that they do not consider
the HRC position binding. See Observations on General Comment No. 24 (52), U.N.
GAOR, 50th Sess., Supp. No. 40, Vol. I, Annex V, at 126-27, U.N. Doc. A/50/40
(1995); Rosenstock, supra, at 130-133 (observations on General Comment No. 24 (52)
by United Kingdom and Northern Ireland); REPORT OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS
COMMITrEE, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., Annex VI, U.N. Doc. A/51/40 (1996)
(observations of France to Article 40). See also Fischer, supra note 100, at 188
("countries routinely fail to implement committee recommendations."). In a similar
vein, the HRC announced in 1997 that North Korea's attempt to withdraw from the
ICCPR was impermissible. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 26, 1997,
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.9 (1997) (on continuity of obligations under the
Covenant).
...See infra notes 163-72, 204-11 and accompanying text.
12 See supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text. See also Bilder, supra note 103,
at 3, 9, 12.

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 15

themselves get the first crack at giving rights specific
meaning.113 In practice, however, most states treat their
human rights obligations as mere paper promises, often
relying on the hollow pretext that their existing domestic
legal system already fully satisfies their international
The unfortunate reality is that most states
obligations.'
simply ignore their international obligations altogether
until pressed to respond through international scrutiny.
Ultimately, however, interpretations of rights by states,
especially during the deliberations of international
organizations, may eventually prove to be a critical element
in the evolving meaning of international human rights
standards." 5
A second and more obvious source of interpretation occurs
in the work of international human rights institutions. A
poorly rationalized mixture of ill-defined mandates,
circumscribed powers, cumbersome mechanisms, and often
overlapping substantive norms generally clouds the
potential role of these institutions in developing the
3 The primary mode for states to give international
rights interpretive content
should theoretically occur in the context of domestic implementation. See supra
notes 96-97. To some extent, states also express interpretive positions in their
conduct of international relations and before international forums such as the 1993
World Conference. See supra notes 45-54 and accompanying text. Finally, states
take positions regarding the meaning of rights during the deliberations of
international monitoring institutions. See infra notes 116-39 and accompanying
text.
114 See, e.g., Mutua, Looking Past, supra note 59, at 224-29; Dominic McGoldrick,
THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE (1991) paras. 3.4, 3.12. See also Donnelly,
InternationalHuman Rights, supra note 96, at 610. One could accuse the United
States of essentially taking this approach both in invoking reservations to its treaty
obligations and in submitting its periodic reports. See Elisa Massimino, Moving
From Commitment to Compliance: Human Right Treaties in U.S. Law, 5 GEO. J. ON
POVERTY L. & POLY 262 (1998).
"5 See supra notes 93-100, 109, and accompanying text; infra notes 128, 131.
Apart from issues of intent, state cooperation is an essential and practical
prerequisite to effective implementation of rights. Perhaps more importantly, a
democratic State's interpretive position on the meaning of rights presumably reflects
an expression of majoritarian choice that must be accounted for when resolving
specific rights claims in concrete situations. See infra notes 141-64, 178-205 and
accompanying text.
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meaning of rights."6
Unfortunately, the international
human rights system is generally characterized by a
multiplicity of nonauthoritative interpretative sources.
A useful analytical framework for describing the
opportunities for interpretation by international human
rights institutions might divide these institutions into three
groups: regional systems such as the African, European,
and Inter-American institutions,"7 U.N. Charter-based
institutions,"8 and treaty-based institutions such as the
Human Rights Committee created by the ICCPR. 19 The
institutions within each of these groupings tend to operate

116

See Donoho, The Role of Human Rights, supra note 1, at 847-50, 859-62, 866-

68. See also Mutua, Looking Past, supra note 59, at 224-237, 242-45; Dinah
PoKempner, Making Treaty Bodies Work: An Activist Perspective, 91 A-S.I.L. PROC.
460, 480-81 (1997); Klaus Samson, Human Rights Coordination Within the U.N.
System, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 620,
621, 653-58, 666-75 (Philip Alston ed., 1992).
,7 See generally GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICE, supra note
103, at chs. 7-9; Victor Rodriguez Rescia & Marc Seitles, The Development of the
Inter-American Human Rights System: A HistoricalPerspective and A Modern-Day
Critique, 16 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 593 (2000); Mark Janis, The Efficacy of
StrasbourgLaw, 15 CONN. J. INTL L. 39 (2000). See also Seth Harris, Asian Human
Rights: Forminga Regional Covenant,ASIAN-PAC. L.& POL'Y J. 17 (2000).
The most prominent Charter-based institution is the Commission on Human
Rights (CHR). See generally Micheal Dennis, CurrentDevelopments: The Fifty-Third
Session of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights, 92 AM. J. INTL L. 112 (1998).
The "Sub-commission" on human rights is a second prominent Charter-based
institution. Because of alleged duplication of the CHR's efforts (or perhaps because
of its independence) the Sub-commission has come under increasing scrutiny of late.
See generally David Weissbrodt et al., An Analysis of the Forty-ninthSession of the
United Nations Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discriminationand Protectionof
Minorities, 11 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 221 (1998). The U.N. recently created the high
profile office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, whose practical
importance has yet to develop clearly.
,9 There are currently six major treaty-based monitoring institutions operating
in cooperation with the United Nations system. Each of these "committees" is
entrusted with monitoring state compliance with the rights recognized in their
respective treaty texts. For further discussion, see ICCPR, supra note 6 (civil and
political rights); ICESCR, supra note 6 (economic and social rights); CERD, supra
note 103 (racial discrimination); CEDAW, supra note 103 (gender discrimination);
Torture Convention, supra note 103; and, Children's Convention, supra note 95
(children's rights).
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in largely similar ways with similar mandates
mechanisms for applying and interpreting rights.

and

A rough but accurate description of the U.N. Charterbased institutions would characterize them as overtly
political, policy-making bodies whose primary purpose is
general oversight
and public scrutiny of human rights
"situations."12 These institutions study, debate, and politic
over human rights on a largely generalized macro-level. 2 '
As a matter of practical politics, the opprobrium of U.N.
Charter-based institutions tends to focus on weak,
friendless, or "pariah" states.'22 They serve no recognizable
adjudicatory function and provide no direct redress for
alleged violations of human rights. 2 '
The overtly political dialogue that takes place before U.N.
Charter-based institutions and, in general, between states
in the conduct of their international relations, provide only
vague and inevitably ambiguous insights into the meaning
of international standards. At best, this process provides
some evidence regarding the existence of consensus among
states over the generalized meaning of some noncontroversial rights.2 2 For example, the work of the U.N.
120

See E.S.C Res. 36, U.N. ESCOR, 1979 Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 26, U.N. Doc.

E/1979/79 (1979); E.S.C. Res. 1235, U.N. ESCOR, 42d Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 17, U.N.
Doc. E/4393 (1967). See also Donnelly, InternationalHuman Rights, supra note 96,
at 612-13; Mutua, Looking Past, supra note 59, at 242-45.
121 Although the CHR has increasingly focused its attention on specific
"thematic"
human rights issues, its most public agenda continues to concern country situations.
See, e.g., Dennis, supra note 118, at 112-19.
122 See, e.g., Nigel Rodley, United Nations Non-Treaty Proceduresfor
Dealingwith
Human Rights Violations, in GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICE,

supra note 103, at 62. See also Dennis, supra note 118, at 121-23 (providing an
overview of those countries subjected to the Commission's scrutiny and
condemnation); Philip Alston, The Commission on Human Rights, in THE UNITED
NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL, supra note 116, at 163-66.
'2 See, e.g., Rodley, supra note 122, at 63-65.
124There are exceptions to this pattern, of course. In recent sessions, the CHR
voted in favor of an international moratorium on the death penalty over the
objection of the United States. See Micheal Dennis, The Fifty-Fifth Session of the
U.N. Commission on Human Rights, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 189, 191-92 (2000) (citing

C.H.R. Res. 1999/61 (Apr. 28, 1999)). The Commission also approved a resolution
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Commission on Human Rights (CHR) demonstrates that all
member states condemn overt violations of physical
integrity such as torture, disappearance or summary
execution.'25 Similar consensus has emerged over egregious
practices involving physical violence against civilians
during armed conflict, including ethnic cleansing, genocide,
and other war crimes. 2 '
Apart from such "physical
integrity" rights, the degree of shared understanding and
meaningful dialogue about the specific meaning and
content of international human rights standards on this
level is not impressive.
Rather, the work of these
organizations is largely clouded by political rhetoric,
obfuscation by recalcitrant and repressive governments,
and meaningless platitudes and hyperbole that perhaps
inevitably dominate a political process.
The activities of the less political, more supervisory
bodies created by various human rights treaties promoted
by the United Nations provide promising opportunities to
mediate the tension between universality and diversity.
Institutions such as the Human Rights Committee (HRC)
necessarily engage in a significant amount of interpretive
activity while pursuing their mandate to monitor the
implementation of rights by state parties. Typically called
"committees" and composed of experts selected by the state
parties, these institutions are limited in their powers and
endorsing an international right to democracy. See id. (citing C.H.R. Res. 1999/57).
Both of these resolutions, however, reflect the CHR's primary function as a general
policy making body rather than a front line force in the interpretation and
implementation of human rights.
The Commission's important work in developing thematic mechanisms has
focused on violations involving such things as disappearances, summary executions,
torture, violence against women, child prostitution, and the death penalty. This
focus on physical violations has broadened somewhat in the 1990s with rapporteurs
or working groups created for religious intolerance, freedom of expression, racism,
and the independence of the judiciary. See Rodley, supra note 122, at 70-71. In
1999, the CHR considered the work of thirteen rapporteurs, two working groups,
four independent experts, and two special representatives. See Dennis, Current
Developments, supra note 118,at 193-94.
'
See C.H.R. Res. 1999/2 (Apr. 13, 1999); C.H.R. Res. 1999/18 (Apr. 23, 1999);
Dennis, supra note 118, at 190.
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mandate. 1"7 In general, a committee's monitoring work is
conducted by reviewing state parties' own self-serving
reports regarding implementation and releasing "general
comments.12 Three of the committees, most notably the
HRC, also engage in 12 quasi-judicial
activities that are
9
described further below.
The state reporting process has some clear potential for
progressively developing state consensus over the specific
meaning of rights. For example, a committee's dialogue
with state party representatives often reflects the
committee's understanding of the specific content of rights,
as states are pressed to explain practices and the committee
makes specific suggestions for improvement. In this sense,
review of state reports should provide a forum for the
expression and consideration
of diversity in the
development of universal rights. The reporting process,
however, is currently too general and amorphous in nature
to provide much meaningful interpretive guidance.
Moreover, such work is clearly not authoritative or binding.
Indeed, there is ample evidence that governments have yet
to take the preparation, presentation, and dialogue
regarding state reports very seriously."'
127

See Donoho, The Role of Human Rights, supra note 1, at 859-62.

'2 See Donoho, The Role of Human Rights, supra note 1; Fischer, supra note 100,
at 177-201 (summarizing reporting procedures under each of the six major
multilateral treaties); Mutua, Looking Past, supra note 59, at 224-31; Helfer &
Slaughter, supra note 98, at 338-45; Andre Byrnes, The "Other" Human Rights
Treaty Body: The Work of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination

Against Women, 14 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 42-51 (1989) (describing the use of general

comments by various treaty bodies). The major multilateral treaties also provide
moribund inter-state complaint procedures that have never been invoked.
129 See infra note 135 and accompanying
text.
"0 See Fischer, supra note 100, at 188; Mutua, Looking Past, supra note 59, at
228-29. See also supra note 110. Apparent disrespect for the reporting process is
reflected in the extremely poor performance of states in preparing and on time
submitting reports. See A.S.I.L. PROC., supra note 116, at 467. But see Michael
O'Flaherty, The Reporting Obligation Under Article 40 of the InternationalCovenant
on Civil and Political Rights: Lessons to be Learned from Consideration by the
Human Rights Committee of Ireland's First Report, 16 HUM. RTS. Q. 515 (1994)
(suggesting that under "favorable conditions," the reporting process can be
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The HRC's General Comments also have some potential
for mediating between the competing goals of universality
and diversity. Although generally modest in scope to date,
General Comments have provided direction regarding
committee views on the meaning of certain important
provisions. 3 ' The abstract nature of General Comments,
however, limits their potential for working through the
delicate balance between universal rights and diversity
implicit in the language of the Vienna Declaration.'"2
Indeed, by definition "General" Comments would not
normally address the contextual "particularities" presented
by various diverse states. More significantly, there is also
little evidence that states currently perceive General
Comments, which are nonbinding, as authoritative. 3

"productive).
131 The HRC, for example, has expressed general views on the substance of
provisions of the ICCPR ranging from non-controversial expositions on the rights
against torture to more delicate subjects such as family, free speech and selfdetermination. See, e.g., Torkel Opsahl, The Human Rights Committee, in THE
UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL, supra note 116, at
412-14. In the more politically sensitive areas, the Committee's early general
comments produced minimal guidance, sometimes only mimicking the language of
the treaty itself. See Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 12(21), 1984
(self-determination); Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 10(19), 1983
(freedom of expression). The Committee increasingly has added normative content
to its interpretations of rights during the 1990s. See, e.g., Human Rights Comm.,
General Comment No. 22(48), 1993, art. 18, annex VI, at 208, U.N. Doc. A/48/40 (pt.
I) (freedom of conscience); Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 18, 1992, at
para. 10, quoted in U.N. Doc. HRIIGEN/1, at 27 (1992) (afrmative action programs
required in certain circumstances). A listing of general comments may be found at
http-//www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf.
""2 See supra note 110 and accompanying text. See also Opsahl, supra note 131,
at 415 (former member of the HRC noting that general comments are "neither
scholarly studies nor secondary legislative acts" and that their generality may cause
"problems of application to specific cases"). General Comments, like the review of
state periodic reports, do not address specific individual violations of rights. See
Fischer, supra note 100; Opsahl, supra note 131, at 412-15. In some senses, the very
concept of a "General Comment" may be seen as presuming a uniform meaning for
rights, since the purpose of such comments are to give guidance applicable generally
to all state parties.
'33 See supra notes 100, 110.
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At best, the state reporting process and the general
comments allow the expression of various interpretations of
rights that may slowly inch the international community
toward some common understandings. In this sense, they
serve an important promotional function that arguably
should be less concerned with accommodations of diversity
than the quasi-judicial processes described below. These
mechanisms have, however, primarily been designed by the
state parties to provide essentially toothless monitoring and
supervision of national implementation of the treaties that
created them. Overall, the potential that such mechanisms
will generate significant interpretive work designed to
accommodate concerns for diversity and autonomy appears
limited.
The most significant opportunity to mediate the
competing claims of universality and diversity in the
meaning of rights occurs in those forums that have been
authorized to serve quasi-judicial, adjudicatory functions.
The individual complaint procedures available under the
Inter-American and European regional human rights
systems provide the most important examples.' 34 There are
also three treaty-based committees, including most
prominently the HRC, that have been authorized to hear
individual petitions brought against those states that
consent to the process. 35
'34

See supra note 117; infra notes 163-205 and accompanying text. Domestic

courts and administrative bodies could conceivably play an enormously important
role in developing international human rights standards. As more states directly
incorporate international treaty obligations into municipal law, domestic
institutions will be required to interpret and apply such standards. These
institutions presumably are well situated to evaluate and take account of competing
culturally based claims or defenses.
135 Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
999 U.N.T.S. 171, 302-46; CERD, supra note 103, art. 14; Torture Convention, supra
note 103, art. 22. Significant efforts have been made to create a similar petitioning
system under CEDAW. See, e.g., Andrew Byrnes & Jane Connors, Enforcing the
Human Rights of Women: A Complaints Procedurefor the Women's Convention?, 21
BROOK. J. INT'L L. 679 (1996). The General Assembly officially adopted the text of
the Optional Protocol to CEDAW in October 1999. G.A. Res. 54/4, G.A. 54th Sess.,
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The work of regional human rights organizations on
individual complaints perhaps represents the international
community's most significant opportunity to address
diversity issues within the international human rights
system. Although distinct from domestic judicial processes
in many significant respects,136 these international
petitioning procedures often involve many of the same
jurisprudential issues that face domestic courts. In each
process, for example, an individual claims that some
specific action or omission by government violates a right
that is set out in an authoritative-albeit usually in
general, abstract-text. The decisionmaker is called upon
to give the abstract right a specific meaning that will
resolve the concrete dispute between the government and
claimant, while inevitably balancing a mixture of competing
interests. Domestic judicial experience teaches us that such
concrete cases have great potential for giving shape and
specific content to the meaning of rights and for developing
standards by which to evaluate critical competing
interests.'
The practical meaning of free speech only begins to take
form when, for example, a tribunal is required to evaluate
specific challenges to sedition laws, prohibitions on
commercial speech, criminalization of pornography, or
aggressive defamation laws. Every such challenge raises
subtle and complex questions regarding the meaning of free
speech that may only be adequately addressed when actual
Agenda Item 109, U.N. Doc. AIRes/54/4 (1999). As of June 2000, five states had
ratified the Optional Protocol. See MILENNIUM SUMIT, supra note 103, at 28.
-6 See generally Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 98, at 282-87, 338-45, 349-51.
137 The jurisprudence of the United States Supreme Court provides a clear
example of how the meaning of rights is developed over time through resolution of
concrete disputes. See infra text accompanying notes 145-60. The variability and
seeming inconsistency of this jurisprudence is also an excellent example of the
inherent indeterminacy of rights as legal concepts. See supra note 105. See also
Stephen Feldman, The Supreme Court in a Post-Modern World: A Flying Elephant,
84 MINN. L. REV. 673 (2000). There is no better example of this process on the
international level than the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights,
described in infra Part V-B.
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circumstances (i.e., context, countervailing public interests,
and actual consequences to the individual) are taken into
account by the decisionmaker."3 '
In essence, the
concreteness
of
the
dispute
allows
interpretive
opportunities that are far more significant to the
development of rights than those available through the
other, more general, supervisory and monitoring functions
of international organizations. 39
Thus, the tension between universal rights, selfgovernance, autonomy, and diversity may perhaps best be
played out in the context of concrete dispute resolution.
The critical question is how international institutions cast
in this role may effectively accommodate diversity and yet
preserve, promote, and develop universal human rights
values. 4 ° It is imperative in this regard that international
See supra notes 2-4; infra notes 147-60, 168-79 and accompanying text.
See Byrnes & Connors, supra note 135, at 699-703.
140 Thus far, international human rights institutions, with the exception of the
E.C.H.R., have made no serious attempt to develop a jurisprudence to deal with the
issues of diversity, multiculturalism and self-governance in the implementation of
rights. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has referred to, in a rather offhanded fashion, the European concept of a margin of appreciation but has yet to
apply or develop the idea in practice. Advisory Opinion OC-4/84, Proposed
Amendments to the Naturalization Provisions of the Constitution of Costa Rica,
Inter-Am. C.H.R. ser. A, no. 4 (Jan. 19, 1984). There have been recent suggestions
within the OAS about utilization of the concept. See Cecilia Medina, Toward
Effectiveness in the Protectionof Human Rights in the Americas, 8 TRANSNAT'L. L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 337, 354-55 (1998). Similarly, the HRC has only taken tentative
steps, simply recognizing the need to account for an element of national discretion in
evaluating certain rights claims. See Herzberg v Finland, Comm. No. 14/61, U.N.
GAOR Hum. Rts. Comm., 37th Sess., Supp. No. 40, at 161, 163-64, U.N. Doc. A/37/40
(1982). See also Lansman et al. v. Finland, No. 671/1995, Human Rights Committee,
58th Sess., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/58/D/671i1995 (1996) at paras. 10.3-10.7 (giving
implicit deference to national authorities' application of Article 27 cultural integrity
rights). Perhaps the most interesting tension between culturally based defenses and
international standards is posed by the Women's Convention, which by its express
terms requires states to eradicate cultural and social practices harmful to women.
See CEDAW, supra note 103, art. 5. The CEDAW Committee must, therefore,
directly confront the tension between universalism and diversity concerns in its
consideration of state periodic reports. Institutional constraints, such as limited
resources and the lack of individual complaint procedures, have hampered the
development of the Committee's jurisprudence. See Byrnes, supra note 128, at 6-7,
12, 43-51; Jennifer Ulrich, Note, Confronting Gender-Based Violence With
138
139
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institutions develop a coherent jurisprudence
decisionmaking and interpretation processes
for the tension between the international
competing universalist
and relativist

The remainder of this article turns to the question of
what sorts of doctrines these international institutions
might adopt to navigate appropriately such issues. It is
important to keep several basic and related considerations
in mind when addressing this question. First, the outcome
of this process is highly dependent on the interpretive
methodologies and orientation of the decisionmaker. Thus,
choices regarding issues such as consideration of original
state intent, textual fidelity and plain meaning, teleological
orientation (e.g., treaty objects and purposes), and
institutional mandate, are critical considerations. 4 '
Second, it is important to note the strong similarity
between the task of accommodating diversity and the
balancing of individual versus public interests that
inevitably accompanies domestic rights jurisprudence.
Third, these issues are, in certain respects, a manifestation
of one of the most basic concerns facing any decisionmaking
body charged with evaluating the legality of governmental
action: the development of appropriate standards of
review. 43 The question ultimately posed is the degree of

InternationalInstruments: Is a Solution To the Pandemic Within Reach?, 7 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 629, 644-46 (2000).
141 See generally P. VAN DIJK & G.J.H. VAN HOOF, THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 71-95 (3d. ed. 1998) (reviewing various
approaches and doctrines of interpretation as applied by the European Court of
Human Rights); Francois Ost, The OriginalCanons of Interpretationof the European
Court of Human Rights, in THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF
HUMAN RIGHTS 283 (Mirielle Delmas-Marty ed., 1992). See infra notes 172-73, 197204 and accompanying text.
142 See supra notes 136-39 and accompanying text; infra
notes 147-54, 169, 175205.
'4
See infra notes 155-60, 204-11 and accompanying text. See also Steven P.
Croley & John H. Jackson, WTO Dispute Procedures, Standard of Review, and
Deference to National Governments, 90 AM. J. INTL L. 193 (1996).
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deference, if any, that the decisionmaker should give
national authorities, or more practically speaking, how
much deference states will demand.' Standards of review
in this regard serve the critical function of preserving a
balance between the need for international supervision,
recognition of the individual's needs and respect for selfgovernance and majoritarian preferences.
Most importantly, the choices made by international
institutions in this regard will ultimately be shaped by the
inherent tension between international supervision of
human rights and national prerogatives. The debate over
universality invokes fundamental issues regarding the
proper role of international human rights institutions, the
legitimacy of their decisionmaking and the allocation of
political and legal authority. These issues are especially
acute in the context of functional democracies whose
domestic decisionmaking processes and autonomy should be
strongly endorsed by international law.
The jurisprudence of both the European Court of Human
Rights (ECHR) and the U.S. Supreme Court developed to
balance the same and analogous concerns, provides
important insights in this regard.
Review of this
jurisprudence reveals several potentially useful doctrines
worthy of evaluation by international human rights
institutions. Primary among these is the "margin of
appreciation" doctrine utilized by the ECHR. Additional
1
A variety of other issues come into play when evaluating the appropriate
standard of review, including practical effectiveness, accountability, and the need to
create mature institutions that are respected by their constituencies. International
human rights institutions are still in the process of maturing, and have been given
limited mandates by the states that created them. See supra text accompanying
notes 98-100, 116-35. Consequently, these institutions will be best served by an
incremental, cautious jurisprudence that establishes their credibility and legitimacy
in the eyes of governments over time. See, e.g., Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 98, at
315-17, 355-56, 367. Standard of review issues also involve questions of expertise,
accountability, and the capacity of international decisionmakers to understand,
appreciate, and relate to the context and circumstances in which the rights are to be
applied.

2001]

UNIVERSAL RIGHTS AND DIVERSITY

443

insights may be drawn from the various standards of
review utilized by courts to balance individual rights
against public majoritarian interests, including the "levels
of scrutiny" analysis employed by the United States
Supreme Court. The following discussion describes this
jurisprudence and evaluates the appropriateness of its
application to the work of international human rights

institutions.
V. DEVELOPING A JURISPRUDENCE OF DIVERSITY WITHIN

UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS
A. Accommodations of Culture in U.S. Rights Jurisprudence

Although recently elevated in prominence internationally,
issues concerning the relationship between individual
rights, cultural traditions, and majoritarian preferences
have long existed within domestic legal systems.'45 Thus,
while the tension between universal rights and diversity
has received no express consideration, 46 cultural and
"s See infra notes 149-55 and accompanying text. Literature exploring the
relationship between domestic law, liberalism, and multiculturalism is extensive.
See, e.g., Shauna Van Praagh, The Education of Religious Children: Families,
Communities and Constitutions, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 1343 (1999); Doriane Coleman,
Individualizing Justice Through Multiculturalism: The Liberals' Dilemma, 96
COLu'. L. REV. 1093 (1996); Leti Volpp, Talking "Culture" Gender, Race, Nation,
and the Politics of Multiculturalism, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1573, 1576-81, 1611-16

(1996); Tran, supra note 2.

1,6 Domestic courts do not generally struggle with questions of sovereignty or
institutional authority in the same fashion that these issues plague international
institutions. There are, however, some important parallels. In the context of
domestic legal systems, the resolution of rights claims are frequently tempered by
concern over the appropriate allocation of power between the legislative and judicial
branches. Thus, questions of institutional authority are important to the United
States Supreme Court's rights jurisprudence, but tend to focus on the Court's role
vis-&-vis other branches of the federal government and the states. Similarly, the
Supreme Court is generally determining minimum federal constitutional standards
that constrain majoritarian will, often as expressed through state or local legislation.
One might say that the Court has a supervisory role that constrains the sovereignty
of state governments, and that rights issues "percolate up" from the states much like
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political heritage arguments have nevertheless played
important roles in U.S. jurisprudence. In this regard, the
United State's Supreme Court's ("Court") approach to the
inevitable
balancing of individual rights
against
majoritarian and public interests, and its methods for
evaluating government justifications, provide useful
insights for this study. In a common scenario, an individual
asks the Court to prevent or require governmental action
based upon some transcendent right typically found in the
U.S. Constitution (or, perhaps someday, in a ratified human
rights treaty.)
Such claims frequently challenge legal
restrictions or penalties that manifest the prevailing moral,
religious, or social preferences of the democratic majority.
The government then defends its actions based on, among
other things, the preservation or promotion of those
majoritarian preferences.
In this context, diversity arguments may play out in a
variety of ways. Perhaps most commonly, such arguments
arise in the context of defining the existence, status, or
specific content of the claimed right. For example, cultural,
social, and religious traditions may be argued in support of,
or in opposition to, claims for recognition of new or implicit
protections derived from abstractions such as privacy or due
process. "' Thus, when a claimant urges recognition of an
they do in international human rights law via national implementation. In the
international context, analogous tensions arise as international institutions attempt
to strike a delicate balance between international supervision of human rights
standards and the needs and interests of various state parties.
117 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973);
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521
U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997) (right to assisted suicide). See also Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479 (1965) (access to contraception); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438
(1972) (access to contraception by unmarried couples); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1
(1967) (right to interracial marriage); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190-96
(1986) (criminalization of private consensual sodomy). In the context of finding
implicit protections for fundamental rights under the U.S. Constitution, the
Supreme Court has attempted to "reign itself in" by asking whether the alleged
fundamental right is "objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation's history and
tradition" and "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such that neither liberty
nor justice would exist if [the right] were sacrificed." Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 72021. This reliance on tradition, invoked as a check on the unelected judiciary, has an
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implicit "right to die" or refuses medical treatment, the
decisionmaker is required to consider social and cultural
traditions regarding such practices.
In a somewhat different vein, rights arguments may also
be used to defend a group's cultural or religious practices
against majoritarian encroachment. For example, religious
and cultural minorities have frequently argued that
cherished practices such as taking peyote, making animal
sacrifice, handling snakes or keeping multiple wives, are
protected from government interference by individual
4
liberties such as freedom of expression or religion. 1
Thus, in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 5 ' the Court recognized the
religious and cultural claims of an Amish religious
inherent tendency to restrict the scope of individual liberties under the Constitution,
particularly when the Court defines the liberty interest involved with a high level of
specificity. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190-96; Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110,
127 (1989) (plurality opinion) (Justice Scalia suggests that an implicit right may
only be found if there is a tradition of protection for the specific activity involved).
The Court's approach in Bowers, Glucksberg, and Michael H. similarly may inhibit
the progressive evolution of Constitutional liberties. One might argue, however,
that the Constitution's authority is itself based on the moral consensus of American
society over the appropriate meaning of Constitutional protections. See Erwin
Chemerinsky, History, Tradition, the Supreme Court and the FirstAmendment, 44
HASTINGS L. J. 901, 908-09, 912-18 (1993); Larry Simon, The Authority Of The
Constitution And Its Meaning: A Preface To A Theory Of Constitutional
Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 603, 613-15, 618 (1985); Larry Simon, The
Authority of the Framers of the Constitution: Can OriginalistInterpretations Be
Justified?, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1482, 1505-10 (1985).
14s See Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278-79 (1990)
(denying right to refuse medical treatment); Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720-21 (denying
right to assisted suicide).
See, e.g., Employment Div. Dep't of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494
U.S. 872, 877-81, 890 (1990) (upholding challenge to criminalization of peyote);
Peyote Way Church of God v. Thornburgh, 922 F.2d 1210, 1216-17 (5th Cir. 1991)
(rejecting an equal protection challenge regarding peyote restrictions); Church of
Lukumi Babalu Aye v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 523, 530-33 (1993) (striking down
local prohibitions on animal sacrifice during Santeria religious rituals); Reynolds v.
United States, 98 U.S. 145, 165-68 (1879) (upholding criminalization of polygamy
practiced pursuant to tenets of Mormon religion). See also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205, 214-17 (1972) (deferring to religious justifications for exempting children
from mandatory education requirements).
1'50 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
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minority, holding that the State could not compel Amish
teenaged children to attend school."'
In Meyer v.
Nebraska, 2 the Court similarly recognized the rights of
parents to educate children in the language of their choice
despite competing interests of society at large in use of the
English language in public schools.'53
When deciding such claims, competing cultural and social
preferences typically require a decisionmaker to balance
general societal interests against the interests of the
individual or group adversely affected by the state's action.
Thus, the government often defends an action alleged to
encroach on protected rights by asserting competing "public
interests."'54 Such arguments may be cast simply in terms
of health and safety, or "public order," but frequently also
rely upon majoritarian expressions of moral, cultural, and
social preferences. 15 Since few rights are absolute even in
the most liberal democratic societies, this evaluation of
competing public interest, often cast in the form of cultural,
social, or political heritage is a critical determinant of the
specific content of most rights.
Such cases are, of course, not completely analogous to the
issues of diversity facing the international human rights

" Id. at 214, 232-33. See also Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925)
(holding that state law requiring attendance at public schools violates fundamental
liberty interests of parents).
15.2 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
'
Id. at 402-03. See also Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168-70 (1944)
(state interest in children justifies lack of religious exemption from child labor laws).
15 See, e.g., cases cited supra notes 147-53. See also Braunfeld v. Brown, 366
U.S. 599, 608-09, 621-22 (1961) (plurality opinion) (denial of religious exemption
from Sunday closing laws); Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, 30 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser.
A) (1979) (impartiality of judiciary); KIass v Federal Republic of Germany, 2 Eur.
H.R. Rep. 214, 230-31 (Sept. 6, 1978) (national security). In the context of human
rights treaties, the recognition of competing public interest is frequently
incorporated directly into the treaty text. See infra note 175.
155 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190-95; Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 569
(1991); City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 282-84 (2000); Williams v. Pryor, 229
F.3d 1331 (11th Cir. 2000) (public morality as justification for criminalizing
distribution of sexual devices).
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system.'56
For example, the Court is not generally
concerned with issues of sovereignty or institutional
authority in the same way that these issues plague
international
institutions.57
The
Court's
rights
jurisprudence, however, mediates tensions similar to those
posed by international human rights claims when it
recognizes limitations on both rights and governmental
action based upon culture and context.
Indeed, the
recognition of context in the interpretation of the meaning
of rights and the inevitable balance between competing
majoritarian and individual interests pervades the rights
jurisprudence of the U.S. courts. Courts are essentially
called upon in these cases to consider cultural, social, and
political heritage in defining rights and their concrete
applications, while striking a balance between the
individual's interests and those of the majority and the
government.
The Court approaches this balance in a variety of ways
depending upon the right involved. Ultimately, the Court
employs tests that serve as standards of review through
which it evaluates the competing interests, including
adherence to cultural or religious heritage. In the area of
equal protection, for example, the Court employs the socalled "levels of scrutiny" analysis in which the standard of
review depends upon the rights being implicated and the
basis for the alleged discrimination.' 8 If the right being
burdened is fundamental, or the basis for distinction
"suspect," the Court utilizes "strict scrutiny" to evaluate the
'

See, e.g., supra notes 1-17, 55-101 and accompanying text.

'57 See supra note 110-16, 129-35, 146 and accompanying text; infra notes 165-92
and accompanying text. Another significant difference is that U.S. Supreme Court
decisions do not generally result in multiple interpretations of the specific meaning
of rights (although split opinions may sometimes leave this meaning somewhat
ambiguous). There are, of course, issues involving federalism which may induce
deference to state governments in ways similar to the deference afforded nations by
international institutions. See supra note 146. The dynamics of the domestic
federal and international contexts are, however, quite different.

See generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND

POLICIES 414-17, 526-32 (1997).
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challenged government action. Under strict scrutiny, the
Court imposes a heavy burden on the government to
demonstrate that its restrictions are narrowly tailored to
achieve a compelling state interest. 9 If the right is not
16
fundamental, nor the distinction suspect or semi-suspect,
the Court instead requires the claimant to demonstrate
that the government's actions are arbitrary and lacking a
"rational basis.' ' 1 Under this lower level of scrutiny the
government is given wide latitude to pursue perceived
public interests so long as it does not act capriciously.
Other constitutional rights, such as substantive due process
and privacy interests, are subject to a similar analysis that
allocates burdens and sets standards of review dependent
on whether the right is considered "fundamental."'62
The primary lesson to be learned from this jurisprudence
is not in its detail but rather in the Court's approach. In
essence, the U.S. Supreme Court employs various
'59 Id. at 416-17. The Court has, to date, only categorized distinctions based on
race, national origin and alienage as "suspect." Id. at 529, 545-56, 614-19.
Discrimination burdening rights considered fundamental has also led to the
application of the strict scrutiny standard. See id. at ch. 10.
160 In the context of gender discrimination and illegitimacy, the Court has
developed an "intermediate" level of scrutiny that requires the government to
demonstrate that the classification serves an "important governmental objective"
and is "substantially related to those objectives." See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190,
197 (1976); Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978). The burden of demonstrating the
existence of an "exceedingly persuasive justification .... rests entirely on the State."
United States v. Virginia Military Inst., 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996).
161 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 158, at 533-44.
162 CHEMERINSKY,
supra note 158, at 638-44. If a right is considered

fundamental, the court applies the strict scrutiny standard of review and, if not, the
rational basis test. Id. For some rights, such as abortion, the Court has developed
specific variations in the standards. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 510 U.S.
1309 (1994). The Court's jurisprudence, in this sense, takes an implicit "in or out"
approach to individual liberties under which the decision as to whether a claimed
activity is a protected fundamental liberty typically determines the outcome of the
case. See, e.g., Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term: Foreword: In
Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal
Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972) (describing strict scrutiny for fundamental
rights as "strict in theory, fatal in fact"). But see Cass Sunstein, The Supreme Court
1995 Term: Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 6, 59-64 (1996)
(describing recent cases striking down legislation under rational basis test).
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standards of review that attempt to account for competing
interests such as the importance of the right, cultural
traditions, and the effect on individuals, majoritarian
preferences, state interests, and its own institutional
limitations. In this sense, the Court is attempting to
navigate issues very similar to those presented to
international human rights institutions by international
diversity.
Attempts to accommodate cultural, religious, and social
preferences within international human rights is, in this
fashion, significantly similar to an endemic feature of
domestic rights jurisprudence; for most rights, it is
inevitably necessary to strike a balance between individual
liberty and the public interest or majoritarian will.
Thought of in this light, claims or defenses based on
cultural, religious, and social "particularities" may be
weighed, and thus accommodated or not, in much the same
way as other competing interests are weighed in the typical
rights equation.
Thus, a challenge to governmentsponsored segregation of sexes in Saudi Arabia, for
example, may reasonably be thought of in terms similar to
the familiar tension between individual rights and general
societal "public" interests. As in most cases, the question
ultimately becomes whether the Saudi Arabian government
can sufficiently justify its alleged restrictions 6. based upon
popular cultural and religious preferences, balanced against
the liberty interests of female citizens."
A significant
M

" Allocation of the burden of proof is a critical component of the standard of
review, which will often determine the outcome of a specific rights dispute. In the
international context, the burden may be a function not only of the right involved
but also the existence or not of international consensus over its meaning. See infra
text accompanying notes 169, 187-96.
" This view of the problem arguably exposes much of the universalist versus
relativist debate as a false dichotomy. Once the obligation to implement a human
rights value is recognized, the issue becomes one of finding meaning in context. The
question is not whether each state may determine solely for itself the meaning of the
rights it has agreed to "recognize," but rather how the state and supervising
international institutions should evaluate the inherent tension between the desires
and needs of rights holders versus the interests of the state, society and popular
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difference, discussed below, is that international
institutions must also factor in the realities of national
sovereignty and the potential limits of international
supervision.
The most critical questions presented involve the
standards of review utilized by the decisionmaker. Equally
important, of course, are choices regarding methods of
interpretation, burdens of proof and the nature and status
of the rights claimed. In the international context, all of
these issues must also be filtered through the dynamics of
state sovereignty, self-governance, and international
supervision. The experience of the European Court of
Human Rights adds critical insights in this regard.
B. The Margin of Appreciation,Human Rights, and Diversity in
Europe

Since the process of European unification began, nearly
all of the issues described above have been played out
before the supranational institutions of Europe.16 Distinct
majorities.
'
There are two primary international judicial institutions with jurisdiction over
a significant number of European states. The ECHR is an institution created
pursuant to the European Convention on Human Rights and is a constituent part of
the Council of Europe, which was created in 1949 after World War II. See VAN DIJK
& VAN HOOF, supra note 141, at 1-2. There are currently 39 European states within
the Council of Europe, subject to the Human Rights Convention and its institutions.
In 1998, Protocol 11 to the Convention revamped its institutional structure to phase
out the European Commission of Human Rights, which previously reviewed all cases
prior to their submission to the ECHR. See Protocol 11, Eur. T.S. No.155, reprinted
in 33 I. L. M. 943 (1994). See generally Jonathon Black-Branch, Observing and
Enforcing Human Rights Under the Council of Europe:The Creationof a Permanent
European Court of Human Rights, 3 BUFF. J. INT'L L. 1 (1996). The European Court
of Justice is the primary judicial organ of the European Union with a mandate and
subject matter very different from that of the ECHR. Its function is to provide a
uniform interpretation of the treaties and laws of the European Union. Although
human rights are not an overt part of the European Union's mandate, the ECJ has
been called upon to interpret and apply E.U. law consistently with the European
Convention on Human Rights and the jurisprudence of the ECHR. See, e.g., Society
for the Protection of Unborn Children v. Grogan, 1991 E.C.R. 1-4685, 3 C.M.L.R. 849
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from domestic judicial processes, European institutions
have been forced to confront diversity issues in light of
critical concerns over domestic sovereignty, democratic selfgovernance and institutional authority. In particular, the
work of the European Court of Human Rights has involved
dilemmas highly analogous to those raised by the
international debate over the universal versus relative
nature of human rights.
Perhaps the most relevant jurisprudence for present66
purposes is the ECHR's "margin of appreciation doctrine."1
The ECHR originally articulated the doctrine in its earliest
cases to address state derogations of rights under alleged
exigent circumstances.16' This doctrine has since evolved as
one of the ECHR's primary tools for accommodating
diversity, national sovereignty, and the will of domestic
majorities, while enforcing effective implementation of
rights under the European Convention. 16
Under this
doctrine, national governments are given a certain degree of
discretion regarding the specific manner in which they
implement European Convention rights.1 69 The rationale
(1991); Grant v. South-West Trains, [1998] 1 C.M.L.R. 993, 1012-14, paras. 43-48
(1998); P. v. S. & Cornwall County Council, (case C-13/94), [1996] 2 C.M.L.R. 247,
paras. 22-25 (1996). See generally Jean Sera, Note, The Case for Accession by the
European Union to the European Convention for the Protectionof Human Rights, 14
B.U. INT' L. J. 151 (1996).
166 See generally H. YOUROW, THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION DOCTRINE IN THE
DYNAMICS OF EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE (1996); VAN DIJK & VAN
HOOF, supra note 141 at 82-95, 731-35; R. St. J. MacDonald, The Margin of
Appreciation, in TE EUROPEAN SYSTEM FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
(MacDonald et al. eds., 1993).
167 Lawless v. U.K., 1 Eur. H.R. Rep. 15 (July 1, 1961, A/3) at paras. 36-38;
Ireland v. United Kingdom, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 25 (Jan. 18, 1978, A/25) at para. 207;
Brannigan & McBride v. United Kingdom, 17 Eur. H.R. Rep. 539, 569-70 (May 26,
1993).
163 See YOUROW, supra note 166, at 6-9, 13, 49, 70-7; Ost, supra note 141, at 30610; M. Delnas-Marty, The Richness of Underlying Legal Reasoning, in THE
EUROPEAN CONVENTION FOR PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL
PROTECTION VERSUS NATIONAL RESTRICTIONS 319, 331-34 (M. Delmas-Marty ed.,
1992).
1
See Handyside v. United Kingdom, 1 Eur. H.R. Rep. 737, 753 (1976); YOUROW,
supra note 166, at 13; VAN DIJK & VAN HOOF, supra note 141, at 83.
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for the "margin of appreciation" rests upon the primacy of
national implementation of rights and the notion that state
authorities are often better situated to judge local
conditions and the various public interests that inevitably
compete with the claims of individuals.17 ° When a state's
choices fall within a predictably amorphous range of
acceptable alternatives, the ECHR will uphold the state's
actions as being within its so-called "margin of
appreciation.'171
The margin of appreciation that the ECHR will provide
depends upon a number of factors, most prominently
whether a European consensus on the issues exists.172 The
importance of the right and the consequences of the state's
170

See, e.g., Handyside, 1 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 753-54; Brannigan, 17 Eur. H.R. Rep.

at 569-70; Otto-Preminger Institut v. Austria, 19 Eur. H.R. Rep. 34, 56-59 (1994).
See also YOUROW, supra note 166, at 6-9, 19-20, 32. A similar version of "subsidiary"
has been expressly incorporated into the treaty regime that governs the European
Union. See generally Daniel T. Murphy, Subsidiarity And/Or Human Rights, 29
UNIV. RICH. L. REV. 67 (1994). In the context of the European Union, the
"subsidiary" principle limits the role of Union institutions over subjects for which
they share jurisdictional competence with national governments. See id. at 69-71.
The E.U. has, however, exclusive jurisdiction over some subjects and none at all over
others that fall outside the scope of the E.U. treaty regime. Id. In contrast, the
"subsidiary" that describes the work of the ECHR simply reflects an arrangement in
which national governments have primary authority and competence to implement
Convention norms, subject to the supervision of the Court. See Handyside, at 75355; The Observer & Guardian v. United Kingdom, 14 Eur. H.R. Rep. 153, 178 (1992).
See also Akdivar v. Turkey, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 143, 198-200 (1997) (Golcuklu, J.,
dissenting).
171 See generally YOUROW, supra note 166; VAN DIJK & VAN HOOF, supra note 141,
at 82-95; Delmas-Marty, supra note 168, at 330-39; authorities cited in supra note
170.
172 In his comprehensive study of the doctrine, Charles Yourow discerns a
variable pattern in the degree of discretion allowed state parties. See YOUROW,
supra note 166, at 31-33, 54-57, 115, 166, 169-71, 192-94. Yourow posits that the
cases reveal a wide margin of state discretion over issues involving morality for
which no clear European consensus has emerged (e.g., Handyside, 1 Eur. H.R. Rep.
at 753-55) while allowing a much narrower margin for favored rights (e.g., Socialist
Party v. Turkey, 27 Eur. H.R. Rep. 51, 86 (1999)) and for issues over which
consensus is found (e.g., Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A)
(1981)). YOUROW, supra note 166, at 31-33, 54-57, 115, 166, 169-71, 192-94. See
also Lawrence Helfer, Consensus, Coherence and the European Convention on
Human Rights, 26 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 133, 141, 157-65 (1993).
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conduct for the individual are also important factors in
determining how wide the margin of appreciation should be
in any particular case.'73
While recognizing the importance of national discretion,
the ECHR has repeatedly emphasized that the margin is
limited by, and must correspond to, the concept of
"European supervision." Under this principle, the ECHR
must assert its role as the final arbiter of European
Convention rights and ultimately determine the consistency
of state conduct with the European Convention and
evolving European standards of human rights. 74 The
to interpretation,
orientation
ECHR's teleological
demanding scrutiny of state justifications and emphasis on
the "effectiveness" of rights, also tends to restrict state
discretion. 75

'
YOUROW, supra note 166, at 106, 115, 188; Renee Koering-Joulin, Public
Morals, in THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION FOR PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS:
INTERNATIONAL PROTECTIONS VERSUS NATIONAL RESTRICTIONS, supra note 165, at
83, 89-91; VAN DIJK & VAN HOOF, supra note 141, at 88-89. See United Communist
Party of Turkey v. Turkey, 26 Eur. H.R. Rep. 121, 149 (1998) at para. 46 (1998-I
Eur. Ct. H.R.1, no. 62) (states enjoy "only a limited margin of appreciation" in
regulating political parties "which goes hand in hand with rigorous European
supervision"); Buckley v. United Kingdom, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 101, 129-30 (1997)
(wide margin for land use planning must be "balanced against the applicant's right
to respect for her home'... "); Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A)
(1981) (wide margin for morals narrowed with respect to private intimate relations).
'74 See YOUROW, supra note 166, at 10, 20, 47, 70-71; Ost, supra note 141, at 30910; VAN DIJK & VAN HOOF, supra note 141, at 92. Yourow argues that there is
uncertainty in the Court's jurisprudence about the degree to which its role is to take
the lead in developing a uniform European standard of human rights through
autonomous interpretation of the Convention as opposed to simply responding to the
evolution of consensus among Convention states. YOUROW, supra note 166, at 114,
135, 194-95. See also Ost, supra note 141, at 305-07 (describing the "dilemma" of
autonomous interpretation but suggests that most members of the ECHR favor it);
Heifer, supra note 172, at 134-35, 137, 142-43 (noting that the ECHR uses a
teleological orientation in combination with evolving European consensus to develop
progressively higher standards of protection).
"r6 Ost, supra note 141, at 286, 290-94; YOUROW, supra note 166, at 55-59, 71.
See also VAN DIJK & VAN HOOF, supra note 141, at 71-82, 92-93.
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Although not strictly limited to such rights, 176 the doctrine
is frequently invoked when the ECHR is evaluating the
scope of personal liberties under Articles 8 through 11,
which inevitably implicate the exception clauses of those
provisions, requiring a balance of individual versus public
interests. These articles, dealing with personal liberties,
including freedom of speech, religion, family life, and
privacy, expressly allow for limitations on those rights in
order to protect certain categories of public interests where
"necessary in a democratic society." 177 The ECHR has relied
on this language to fashion tests for evaluating and limiting
the exercise of discretion allowed national authorities in
their implementation of rights. Thus, limitations on such
rights must be designed to accomplish a "pressing social
need"17s and the means chosen must be "proportionate" to
those ends.7 9 In this regard, the ECHR has recognized a
176

See VAN DIJK & VAN HOOF, supra note 141, at 85 (margin doctrine potentially

applicable to any case requiring a "balancing of interests"). See also YOUROW, supra
note 166, at 15; Delmas-Marty, supra note 168, at 331 (doctrine only applies to
Article 15 derogations, discrimination cases under Article 14 and Articles 8-11).
177 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental
Freedoms (as amended), arts. 8-11, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, E.T.S. 5 (entered into force
Sept. 3, 1953) [hereinafter European Convention]. See Dudgeon, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. at
162, 164-65. The language of Article 8 is nearly uniform among these provisions; it
explicitly allows for restrictions "necessary in a democratic society in the interests of
national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the
protection of the rights and freedoms of others." European Convention, supra, art. 8.
'78 See, e.g., Dudgeon, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 164-64; Norris v. Ireland, 142 Eur. Ct.
H.R. (ser. A). (1988), at 198-200 (requiring "particularly serious reasons" for
interference with intimate private life); Smith & Grady v. United Kingdom, 29 Eur.
H.R. Rep. 493, 529 (1999); Barthold v. Germany, 7 Eur. H.R. Rep. 383, 403 (1985).
179 Van Dijk & van Hoof suggest that the "proportionality principle"
has "acquired
the status of general principle in the Convention system." VAN DIJK & VAN HOOF,
supra note 141, at 81. The exact measure of proportionality will vary depending
upon context and the rights involved. Thus, more exacting proportionality has been
required when states have justified restrictions on personal freedoms, as opposed to
state restrictions affecting property rights (requiring a "fair balance"). Id. The more
exacting standard is also used in the context of discrimination under Article 14 of
the Convention. Id. In this regard, as in many others, the Court's jurisprudence for
balancing individual and state interests is strikingly similar to that utilized by the
U.S. Supreme Court when faced with similar issues. See supra notes 136-39, 152-61
and accompanying text.
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hierarchy of rights, deeming some so fundamental to
democratic society that little discretion is allowed to
national governments. 8 ' Similarly, some rights, such as
criminal due process, are set out in detail in the European
Convention and have not generally involved margin
analysis, perhaps because they are less susceptible to
legitimate variations among state parties.'
Review of the ECHR's application of the doctrine reveals
its central function: the ECHR utilizes the "margin of
appreciation" doctrine to accommodate variations among
state parties in their implementation of rights, while at the
same time preserving the core "European" values they
reflect. In this regard, the ECHR's application of the
doctrine has involved resolution of precisely the same kind
of conflicts presented in the compromise language of the
European governments have
Vienna Declaration.
frequently defended against alleged violations of the
European Convention by asserting cultural, religious, and
moral interests, presumably representative of majoritarian
will. "82
' When a government defends its action or omission
on such grounds, the ECHR is called upon to strike a
balance between a European (international) human rights
standard and the cultural, social, or religious preferences of
1'8

See, e.g., Incal v. Turkey, 29 Eur. H.R. Rep. 449, 450, 480 (2000) (restrictions

on political speech, an "essential foundation of democratic society," requires "closest
scrutiny"); United Communist Party of Turkey v. Turkey, 26 Eur. H.R. Rep. 121, 149
(1998). Yourow summarizes the cases as demonstrating a wide margin for national
security and socio-economic policy issues, a "certain" margin for most personal
liberties and a "narrow" margin for restrictions on preferred rights such as political
speech. See YOUROW, supra note 166, at 155, 188-91. See also VAN DIJK & VAN
HOOF, supra note 141, at 87-91.
181 See VAN DIJK & VAN HOOF, supra note 141, at 86.
'82 See, e.g., Dudgeon, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R., at 155; Tyrer v. United Kingdom, 2 Eur.
H.R. Rep. 1, 10 (1979-80); Handyside, 1 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 753. See also Open Door,
246 Eur. Ct. H.R. Rep. (ser. A), at 8 (1992). A potentially important consideration in
accounting for the genuineness of a state's assertion of cultural or moral traditions
may be the existence (or lack thereof) of true democratic representation. In the
context of non-democratic states, the same claims are made but their genuineness
may be questioned in that governmental action in a totalitarian regime lacks the
legitimacy or authenticity that democratically-enacted legislation provides.
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the state and its democratic majority.183
In a case
challenging Irish legislation prohibiting divorce, for
example, the ECHR was essentially asked to decide
whether Ireland could follow a path different from the rest
of Europe based on the Irish majority's deeply rooted
religious and moral aversion to divorce.'
Similar considerations have been raised in a variety of
other cases brought before the ECHR, such as challenges to
state policies involving the education of school children," 5
transexualism, 88 criminalization of sodomy,"' abortion,"'
and free speech.8 9 The underlying question is whether the
specific meaning and application of rights, such as free
speech, privacy, and family life, may vary from state to
state within the European system based upon context,
history, religion, or moral preferences. In this context, the
ECHR must not only weigh competing interests that may
be couched in terms of culture or tradition, but also balance
the tension between national prerogatives and self-

... VAN

DiJK & VAN HOOF, supra note 141, at 92; YOUROW, supra note 166, at 70-

71, 62-63, 196; Ost, supra note 141, at 306-10; Delmas-Marty, supra note 168, at
331-33.
' See, e.g., Johnston v. Ireland, 9 Eur. H.R. Rep. 203, 218-19 (1987). In this
case, the Court ultimately skirted the issue of majoritarian morality versus
individual liberty when it decided, based on a rather technical reading of the
Convention text, that divorce was omitted from the text relating to marriage rights
and thus not protected. Id.
18
See, e.g., Kjeldsen v. Denmark, 1 Eur. H.R. Rep. 711 (1979-80). See also
Valsamis v. Greece, 24 Eur. H.R. Rep. 294 (1997) (participation of Jehovah's Witness
in school parade); Handyside, 1 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 753-55.
"' Cossey v. United Kingdom, 13 Eur. H.R. Rep. 622 (1991); B. v. France, 16 Eur.
H.R. Rep. 1 (1993). See also X v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. H.R. Rep. 143, 169 (1997)
(state refusal to register transsexual as father of child conceived through artificial
insemination).
187 Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser.
A) (1981). See also Smith,
29 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 493.
188 See Bruggemann v. Germany, App. No. 6959/75, 3 Eur. H.R. Rep. 244, 253-58
(1981) (commission report); Patton v. United Kingdom, App. No. 8416/78) 3 Eur.
H.R. Rep. 408 (1981) (commission report).
189 Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, 30 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1979); Muller v.
Switzerland, 13 Eur. H.R. Rep. 212 (1988); Open Door, 246 Eur. Ct. H.R. Rep., at 8.
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governance, and the development of uniform European
standards.
The ECHR's application of the margin of appreciation
doctrine clearly recognizes that variations in the
implementation of rights may be acceptable, particularly
regarding questions of public morality or other issues for
which no strong European consensus exists.19
In
Handyside v. United Kingdom, for example, the ECHR
found the lack of European consensus on issues of public
morality required that the United Kingdom be given a wide
margin of appreciation concerning its decision to ban a
sexually explicit book designed for the education of
children. 9 ' In Miller v. Switzerland, the ECHR employed
similar reasoning to uphold the decision of local Austrian
authorities to close a sexually provocative art showing that
was open to the public without restriction. 92 By allowing
such discretion, the ECHR has, in effect, endorsed
variations in the implementation of rights reflective of
European diversity.'93
,90 See supra note 170; Koering-Joulin, supra note 173, at 84-87; Delmas-Marty,
supra note 168, at 332-33; YOUROW, supra note 166, at 3-9; VAN DIJK & VAN HOOF,
supra note 141, at 92-94.
Handyside v. United Kingdom, 1 Eur. H.R. Rep. 737, 753-54 (1976). See also
Kroon v. Netherlands, 19 Eur. H.R. Rep. 263, 289-90 (1995) (Morenilla J.,
dissenting). Although similar restrictions on free expression were at issue in the
Sunday Times case, the government's justification centered on protection of judicial
integrity rather than morals. Since the Court found a "fairly substantial measure of
common ground" regarding judicial integrity and free speech, it distinguished
Handyside and reasoned that "a more extensive European supervision corresponds
to a less discretionary power of appreciation" over that issue. See Sunday Times, 30
Eur. Ct. H.R. at 274.
m Miiller, 13 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 227-32. See also Wingrove v. United Kingdom, 24
Eur. H.R. Rep. 1, 6-17, 19-21 (1997) (upholding government refusal to license video
based on blasphemous content). It is noteworthy that Milller actually involved the
exercise of discretion by local rather than national authorities, reminiscent of the
problematic U.S. community standards approach to obscenity endorsed by the U.S.
Supreme Court. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24-26 (1973).
" The obvious cost of this approach is that it tends to inhibit the development of
a common European standard for human rights derived from the Convention. See
Helfer, supra note 170, at 142-43. See also Eyal Benvenisti, Margin of Appreciation,
Consensus, and Universal Standards, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT' L. & POL. 843, 850-53
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As a result, the ECHR has tempered national discretion,
and thus the degree of variation among states, where a
European consensus on the issue exists, or the importance
of the right demands it.1 14 Thus, when presented with a
challenge to Ireland's anti-sodomy laws, the ECHR was
forced to evaluate the competing claims of the Irish
majority, which had exerted its moral and cultural
preferences in criminal statutes, and individual claimants
who were adversely affected by that legislation.19 The Irish
Government defended the legislation by, among other
things, relying on the prevailing moral sensibilities of its
population9
The ECHR explicitly acknowledged the
significance of this dominant cultural position in Irish
society but found that the existence of a contrary consensus
among other parties to the European Convention should
prevail.97
In essence, that consensus helped the ECHR determine
what the core value of the right of privacy included and how
to use that consensus as a baseline upon which to evaluate
the Irish legislation. In contrast, the ECHR has in other
cases used the lack of European consensus to extend a wide
margin of appreciation
to national authorities.'98
(1999)

(arguing that the margin,

particularly

in its reliance

on consensus,

undermines universal rights and international protections for minorities).
See supra notes 172, 177-81, 190.
195 See generally Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1981);

Norris v. Ireland, 142 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1988).
'9
See Dudgeon, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 162-66.
197 Id.
at 165-68. See Lawrence Helfer, Finding a Consensus on Equality: The
Homosexual Age of Consent and the European Convention on Human Rights, 65
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1044, 1046-47, 1057, 1072-77 (1990) (critiquing the ECHR approach
to finding consensus, particularly regarding the age of consent).
198 See Handyside, 1 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 753-54; Muller, 13 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 229-

32; Cossey, 13 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 641; Wingrove, 24 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 19-21; X v.
United Kingdom, 24 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 169. As noted below, in European states
these preferences are associated with democratic majorities. See infra notes 215-17

and accompanying text. In this sense, the discretion allowed national authorities
arguably reflects a degree of appropriate respect for democratic self-governance.
Correspondingly, one could also argue that a lack of democracy requires greater
scrutiny of government's cultural justifications and little deference. See supra note

6.
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Significantly, the ECHR has recognized that consensus over
rights, and acceptable state restrictions on them, is
evolutionary as opposed to static.'99
Presumably, the
interpretation of a right's specific content will evolve along
with European
society, ensuring the progressive
development of "European" standards.
The ECHR's view of the appropriate margin is also
influenced by the nature of the right involved and the
consequences to the individual claimant caused by its
restriction. Private sexual conduct in Dudgeon v. United
Kingdom, for example, involved the "most intimate aspects
of private life" requiring significant justifications for state
interference."'
In essence, the ECHR has recognized a
hierarchy among rights protected by the European
Convention. 0°' Thus, alleged infringements or restrictions
on rights such as free press and speech2 2 and political
participation 203 have been subjected to a narrower margin
of state discretion than less favored rights such as the use
of property.2 4 One manifestation of this approach is the
ECHR's frequent reference to-and reliance on-its
perception of modern, liberal, and democratic society and
its foundation based in "pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness without which there is no democratic
society".2 5 State interference with those rights that are
See VAN DIJK & VAN HOOF, supra note 141, at 77-80; Ost, supra note 141, at
290.
Dudgeon, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 164.
201 See supra note 180. YOUROW, supra note 166, at 87, 115, 155, 188-91.
m Castells v. Spain, 14 Eur. H.R. Rep. 445 (1992); Incal, 29 Eur. H.R. Rep. at
450; Sunday Times, 30 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 246-48; Lingens v. Austria, 8 Eur. H.R. Rep.
407, 418 (1986).
2w See, e.g., Socialist Party, 27 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 86; United Communist Party of
Turkey, 26 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 149.
See Immobiliare Saffi v. Italy, 30 Eur. H.R. Rep. 756, 779 (2000) (wide margin
in housing regulation); James v. United Kingdom, 8 Eur. H.R. Rep. 123, 145 (1986);
Jacobsson v. Sweden, App. No. 19438/92, 74 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 220,
223-24 (1993); Buckley v. United Kingdom, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 129-30 (1997); VAN
DIJK & VAN HOOF, supra note 141, at 628, 640-41.
'5 Handyside, 1 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 754-55; Smith, 29 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 529; OttoPreminger Institut, 19 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 56-59; Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur.
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deeply associated with these ideals requires a high level of
justification."6
For present purposes, the significance of the ECHR's use
of the margin of appreciation doctrine does not rest on the
complex nuances of that jurisprudence.
Indeed, as
discussed below, there are a number of obvious and
significant differences in circumstances that counsel
against wholesale adoption of the margin of appreciation
doctrine in the global context.
Rather, it's potential
significance lies in its most salient features. First, the
ECHR uses the margin of appreciation doctrine to recognize
a variable degree of state discretion in the implementation
of rights based on, among other things, cultural, religious
and social preferences.2 "7 The acknowledgment of such
preferences in the interpretation of human rights, as
seemingly demanded by the language of the Vienna
Declaration, probably requires the allowance of some such
discretion. Second, the ECHR attempts to constrain that
discretion by reliance on a number of relevant factors,
among the most important of which is the existence of
consensus over meaning, the importance of the right, and
the consequences for the individual.0 8
Such factors,
particularly reliance on evolving international consensus,
reflect the benefits of international supervision and allow
the progressive development of rights standards.
The
selection of appropriate criteria by which to limit state
discretion is, of course, critical for avoiding abuse and
preserving core human rights values.0 9 Third, the ECHR
Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1981). See Ost, supra note 141, at 294; Delmas-Marty, supra note
168, at 327-28.
206 But see Otto-Preminger Institut,
19 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 57-60 (using the
concepts of toleration and pluralism to justify government ban on blasphemous
movie designed to protect the religious "feelings" of majority Catholic population).
There are obvious parallels between this mode of analysis and the rights
jurisprudence of the United States Supreme Court. See supra notes 158-62 and
accompanying text.
2" See supra notes 190-206 and accompanying text.
208 See supra notes 172-81 and accompanying text.
211 See supra notes 141-44 and accompanying text. Other
important doctrines
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recognizes a hierarchy among rights in measuring state
discretion.21 '
While controversial for other reasons,211
hierarchies among rights in this context would allow
human rights institutions to distinguish those rights
susceptible to culturally based variation from those that are
not. Such hierarchies similarly allow these institutions to
demand greater justifications for state limitations on
certain rights. 212 Fourth, the ECHR couples the margin of
appreciation doctrine with a dynamic and teleological view
of interpretation such that the meaning of rights and its
view of permissible restrictions generally favor an
expansive view of rights and protection of the individual21
In this way, human rights institutions may work toward
the progressive development of rights, enhance the
protection given to individuals, and avoid stagnation in the
status quo of oppressive cultural traditions. The ECHR has
adopted an approach to interpretation that ultimately
emphasizes protection of the right holder by placing the
burden ofjustification for restrictions on the state.

that are used by the ECHR to constrain state discretion include a teleological
orientation to interpretation and the principles of "effective remedy" and "European
supervision." See supra notes 174-75 and accompanying text.
210 See supra notes 163-65, 179-80, 201-04 and accompanying text.
211 The idea that there may be hierarchies among rights has been strongly
resisted in many quarters, especially in the developing world. See, e.g., Indivisibility
and Interdependence of Economic, Social, Cultural, Civil, and Political Rights, G.A.
Res. 44/130, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 209, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (1990).
Much of the genesis for this resistance lies in the debate regarding priorities
between economic development rights versus political and civil rights. While most
Western governments and non-governmental organizations have human rights
agendas dominated almost exclusively by civil and political rights, many Third
World governments have alleged the primacy of economic and social rights. Rhoda
Howard, The Full-Belly Thesis: Should Economic Rights Take Priority Over Civil
and PoliticalRights? Evidence from Sub-SaharanAfrica, 5 HUM. RTS. Q. 467, 469
(1983). See also Civic, supra note 48, at 320-22 (describing China's continuing
adherence to the argument that economic rights take priority over civil and political
liberties).
212 The use of hierarchies among rights is a central feature
of American
jurisprudence regarding Constitutional liberties. See generally CHEMERINSKY,
supra note 158, at 638-43. See supra notes 158-62 and accompanying text.
1 See supra notes 174-75 and accompanying text.
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Finally, the ECHR remains the final arbiter of the
meaning of rights, tempering state discretion with
international supervision. Although perhaps inevitably
problematic in a state-centric system, the exercise of
meaningful supervisory authority seems critical to the
ultimate success of the international human rights system
and to the progressive development of rights.
These general features of the margin of appreciation
doctrine seem appropriate and useful to the difficult task
suggested by the Vienna Declaration: advancing universal
rights while simultaneously respecting cultural diversity,
self-governance and autonomy. Their critical attribute is
the creation of an approach to these competing concerns
that allows a measured degree of discretion to national
authorities, significantly limited by appropriate criteria and
subject to international supervision. Thus, the essential
features of margin of appreciation jurisprudence, when
coupled with a dynamic teleological view of interpretation
that endorses progressive evolution of human rights,
present a promising general approach to the problem of
mediating between universality and diversity at the
international level.
There are, of course, also reasons to doubt whether the
margin of appreciation doctrine itself may or should be
adopted generally by other international human rights
institutions. Its potential, although promising, is tempered
by some significant differences in context and institutional
circumstances.
Most obviously, the European system
enjoys a degree of homogeneity in cultural, political, and
religious orientations not shared by global human rights
institutions.2 "4 While there is significant, and growing,
diversity within the Council of Europe, 15 these differences
214

See, e.g., David Seymour, The Extension of the European Convention on

Human Rights to Centraland EasternEurope:Prospects and Risks, 8 CONN. J. INT'L
L. 243, 244 (1993).
215 See id. at 245-47. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, membership in the Council
of Europe has increased dramatically with the addition of former socialist states
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are clearly not as profound as those that exist globally.
Moreover, these differences pale in comparison to important
commonalities among European Convention states. By
agreement, these European states are committed, at least
in theory, to some form of liberal democracy216 and are
increasing reliant on market capitalism.
With the
exception of some recently admitted members, nearly all
have strong traditions favoring individual autonomy with
an emphasis on civil and political liberties. Most are also
dominated by Judeo-Christian religious traditions.217
Nearly all have industrialized economies, with highly
educated populations.
In this context, one of the primary factors constraining
state discretion under margin of appreciation analysis, the
existence of a significant degree of "European consensus,"
makes considerable sense. It may make less sense globally
where significant consensus over specific issues will often
be hard to find. Moreover, European Convention states
share fundamental conceptions about the function of rights
in democratic societies. These critical beliefs about the
relationship between rights, the individual, and society are
not universally shared among the world's diverse
from Central and Eastern Europe. Since 1990, membership in the Council has
increased by 18 states, most of which are former Soviet bloc countries. See Council
of Europe, at http/www.coe.intlportalT.asp (last visited Dec. 21, 2001). All of these
states have also ratified the European Convention on Human Rights as an
unwritten precondition for membership in the Council. Seymour, supra note 214, at
250. See also Rudolf Bernhardt, Current Development: Reform of the Control
Machinery Under the EuropeanConvention on Human Rights:Protocol 11, 89 AM. J.
IN'L L. 145, 147 n.10 (1995). The addition of states such as Bulgaria, Russia,
Albania, Romania and Slovenia, has added significant new diversity to the European
human rights system. See Seymour, supra note 214, at 244-47.
216 See Cesare P.R. Romano, The Proliferationof International Judicial
Bodies:
The Pieces of the Puzzle, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POLY 709, 777-78 (1999); Thomas
M. Franck, The Democratic Entitlement, 29 U. RICH. L. REv. 1, 28 (1994). All
members of the Council also participate in the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, which has made democratic governance a pre-requisite to
official recognition of statehood and government legitimacy. Franck at 27-29.
217 Turkey and Albania have predominately Islamic populations and
stand out as
clear exceptions to the Judeo-Christian religious orientation of the other Convention
states.
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communities.
Thus, the degree of potential "cultural
discord"
between
national
versus
international
interpretations of rights and their appropriate function is
far more likely on a global, as opposed to a regional, level.
More importantly, the search for consensus on the global
level may often prove not only elusive but also may hinder
the development of human rights standards. An obvious
critique of the margin of appreciation doctrine is that the
discretion it allows constitutes an abdication of function.
The very parties (i.e., governments and political majorities)
whose behavior is to be constrained are allowed to set the
agenda. If the lack of global consensus leads to wide
margins of discretion, international rights may conceivably
be reduced to lowest common denominators, with only
minimum core values being protected. Relying on the
consensus of majorities, the margin of appreciation doctrine
may inadequately protect individuals and minorities from
the "tyranny" of democracy. The use of discretion limiting
criteria other than consensus may, however, combat this
prospect and is therefore critical.218
The most serious distinction between the European
System and other international human rights institutions
may well be their institutional contexts.
The ECHR
supervises the conduct of states that, by and large, respect
both human rights and recognize the ECHR's legitimacy.19
Its mandate is well defined and its authority and credibility
well established. For a variety of reasons that generally
218 See supra notes 208-13 and accompanying text.
219 Professors Helfer and Slaughter have perceptively

described the "sad paradox"

that human rights institutions are most "effective" in the states that "arguably need
them least: those whose officials commit relatively few, minor, and discrete human
rights violations." Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 98, at 329. They cite the
existence of strong, independent domestic institutions, committed to the rule of law
and responsive to individual claimants, as a "strongly favorable precondition for
effective supranational adjudication." Id. at 333-34. See also Harold Hongju Koh,
How is InternationalHuman Rights Law Enforced?, 74 IND. L. J. 1397, 1404-04
(1999) (critiquing the view that the existence of liberal democratic institutions itself
explains compliance).
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don't prevail in the context of other human rights
institutions, European Convention States have accepted the
ECHR and its judgments as legitimate, binding and
enforceable.220 This authoritative status ensures that the
important concept of "European supervision " 21 1 is a
meaningful one. It similarly allows the ECHR, as the final
authority on European rights issues, to both effectively
check national discretion and to limit the possibility that
oppressive practices will be preserved in the name of
diversity. Other international human rights institutions
simply do not currently enjoy either the mandate or status
of the ECHR 2
To the degree that institutional legitimacy is a critical
factor in limiting state discretion, limitations in the existing
international system may at first seem to counsel against
adoption of margin of appreciation analysis. There is,
however, an important counter consideration. Taking the
long view, the margin of appreciation doctrine may well
provide international institutions with the flexibility
necessary for their long-term development as credible and
authoritative decisionmakers. The ECHR owes much of its
current success to a process of incremental confidence
building over time, slowly substantiating its authority and
legitimacy with the very states that created it. 2 3 The
margin of appreciation doctrine has been one of the
essential ingredients
in the ECHR's incremental
development of legitimacy by recognizing, while at the same
time controlling, a significant element of discretion by state
authorities. 4
The persistent realities of national
m See Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 98, at 276-77, 293-98. See also Seymour,
supra note 214, at 244; Janis, supra note 117, at 39-46 (pointing out unanswered
questions regarding the "efficacy" of the Strasbourg institutions).
2
See supra notes 174, 198-99, 213 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 116-36 and accompanying text; Helfer & Slaughter, supra
note 98, at 336-68 (providing a general overview of similarities and contrasts
between the characteristics and circumstances of the HRC and the ECHR); Mutua,
Looking Past,supranote 59, at 214-37, 252-60.
'3
See Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 98, at 355-56, 367; supra notes 143-44.
2
See YOUROW, supra note 166, at 196; Helfer, supra note 172, at 137-38; Helfer
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sovereignty within the state-centric international legal
order require that international human rights institutions
follow a similar path of incremental development.
Intelligent deployment of the margin of appreciation
doctrine
may allow currently weak international
institutions to build their authority over time and slowly
work toward more assertive forms of jurisprudence as their
legitimacy grows.
CONCLUSION

The profound diversity which characterizes our world
poses significant dilemmas for international human rights
standards.
How can rights be universal and yet
accommodate the demands of genuine diversity and the
important values of democratic self-governance and
autonomy?
While there are no easy answers to this
important question, significant insights regarding how
international institutions might approach the problem may
be drawn from the jurisprudence of the European Court of
Human Rights and of the U.S. Supreme Court. Important
parallels exist between the issues these courts confront and
those of international diversity and the balancing of
individual versus communal interests.
The nuanced
standards of review created by these institutions,
particularly the ECHR's "margin of appreciation" doctrine,
provide important insights regarding the ways in which
concerns over sovereignty, institutional roles, state
discretion, and international supervision may be mediated
in a positive manner to protect human rights without
sacrificing respect for democratic self-governance and
diverse cultural, social, and political traditions.

& Slaughter, supra note 98, at 315-17.

